SPILL OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE EXERCISE 1998

Prince William Sound
and
Western Gulf of Alaska

September 18-23, 1998

FINAL REPORT

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This joint evaluation report of the 1998 Spill of National Significance Exercise was prepared by a team of representatives from BP, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, the U.S. Coast Guard and ERST/O'BRIEN'S. Having received consensus approval from the lead organizations, I hereby recommend this Final Report for official acceptance.

Garry Willis
Exercise Manager – BP

ACCEPTED:

Richard Campbell
President – BPXA

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Commissioner – ADEC

Admiral Collins
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BP SONS 1998

FINAL REPORT

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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 18-23, 1998, British Petroleum, along with Alaska's Department of Environmental Conservation and the United States Coast Guard, conducted a Spill of National Significance (SONS) exercise. Additional response partners included Alyeska, ARCO Marine, PWS Regional Citizens' Advisory Councils and Maritime Overseas Corporation. The exercise involved three major components:

- Transportation and deployment of out-of-region oil spill response resources from Oakland, California, Southampton, England, and Alaska's North Slope.
- A command post exercise of the Incident Management Team (IMT) in Valdez, Alaska, and
- A Crisis Management Team (CMT) and National Incident Command (NIC) exercise, followed by a SONS workshop of senior level personnel from the three participating organizations.

The exercise scenario involved a fully loaded tanker with 850,000 barrels of crude oil outbound from the Valdez Terminal. The tanker ran aground at Middle Point on Montague Island at the south end of Prince William Sound initially spilling 300,000 bbls of crude. The actual exercise play began on Day 4, of the hypothetical incident, following transition from Alyeska to the BP team. The Unified Command and integrated response teams, using advanced technologies, demonstrated their ability to initiate and support a long-term response to this worst case scenario. Appendix A contains a list of the exercise participants.

During the exercise, controllers and evaluators observed the events and developed comments. Players also provided written critique comments and were debriefed for their accomplishments and lessons learned. A Quick Report was issued shortly after the exercise, which served to provide initial feedback of significant observations to the participating organizations, players and other stakeholders. In addition, the Quick Report provided focus on major exercise Accomplishments and Issues for further analysis. This Final Report provides the consensus recommendations for the exercise, as a direct result of interviews conducted with nineteen key participants and evaluators (see Appendix H). The SONS exercise Final Report can be viewed on the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation website at http://www.state.ak.us/dec/sons98/.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The BP 1998 Alaska SONS exercise was completed as planned and scheduled, meeting **all** exercise objectives with no injuries or incidents. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, United States Coast Guard, Alyeska/SERVS, ARCO Marine and Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council were instrumental in this success. An additional 60 plus organizations and approximately 2,000 persons, including crews of commercial, fishing and Coast Guard vessels and aircraft, as well as industry and agency planning and operational staff were involved in this massive exercise and are to be congratulated for their contributions. The financial and personnel support provided for this exercise further demonstrate the strong industry and government commitment towards protecting the marine environment.

Objectives

Exercise objectives which were accomplished are as follows:

- Demonstrate the ability to deploy and operate out-of-region resources as designated by the Prince William Sound (PWS) Tanker Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan or Core Plan planning guidelines.

- Demonstrate the ability of the responsible party and Unified Command (UC) to effectively manage a sustained response to an Alaska SONS originating in Prince William Sound.

- Demonstrate the ability to incorporate and effectively utilize advanced oil spill response technologies to support the UC and Incident Management Team (IMT).

- Demonstrate the ability of the responsible party and National Incident Command (NIC) to effectively direct a sustained response to a SONS in Alaska.

- Demonstrate the ability to implement an integrated Joint Information Center (JIC) model for a SONS.

- Assess the effectiveness of the various response contingency plans of the responsible party, state and federal levels to adequately address the issues and support the response personnel for a SONS originating in Prince William Sound. (See Appendix D for a list of plans that were exercised).

- Maximize the ability of the participants and stakeholders to receive certification and credit for participation in the training and exercise programs.

Accomplishments

The following major accomplishments, among others, resulted from this effort. Many of these accomplishments were completed in the preparation phase leading up to the exercise, which is a very valuable and often overlooked contribution to overall preparedness that results from these events.

- A joint BP/ADEC/USCG safety risk assessment for the exercise was conducted, which contributed toward an injury free exercise.

- Extensive community involvement was encouraged through a series of seven village and interested party briefings.

- Meetings were held with IMT and CMT/NIC members during a four-month period prior to the exercise to tabletop and discuss actions which would have taken place in the first 72 hours of this simulated incident. These sessions provided an excellent opportunity to establish working relationships and thoroughly discuss and resolve issues.

- A 33-page scenario was developed by Alyeska/SERVS and then modified by BP/ADEC/USCG and PWS RCAC to incorporate the actions which would have been taken by the participating organizations in the first 72 hours.

- Environmental truth developed background information for the first three days to establish a scenario, including permits (dispersant use, in-situ burning, land use, wildlife hazing, capture and treatment), plans (decanting, on-shore cleanup, wildlife, waste and decontamination), and environmental data (trajectory, mass balance, shoreline oiling survey status and storage inventories).

- Logistics developed and pre-planned over the previous year extensive Support Modules which can now be used in all future events, including but not limited to, staging areas, warehouses, load-out areas, on-water solid waste collection, waste storage facilities, food supply, fuel and lubricants re-supply, communications, camp and personnel transportation. Each module included specific equipment lists, available resources and facilities, vendors and layout drawings.

- Participant training was conducted and included general and specific subjects such as, Skill Enhancement and Leadership Seminars (SEALS), Incident Command System (through I-400), Area Command, Crisis Management, External Affairs/JIC, Response ™ software, ATOM Model (trajectory), Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Team (SCAT), Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA), Environmental Unit and HAZWOPER.

- An Incident Action Plan was prepared for implementation on the day of the exercise which contained all essential components, including Incident Objectives, Site Safety & Medical Plans, Incident Organization and over 300 ICS 204 Division Assignment forms.

- ❖ All out-of-region resources arrived and were deployed within the contingency response planning requirements. Significant logistics were accomplished by flying two planeloads of equipment from California and England within the specified time, and trucking an Alaska Clean Seas' mini-barge from Alaska's North Slope.

- ❖ Tier III fishing crews were trained prior to the exercise and all fishing vessels performed well, using various response positions and boom configurations.

- ❖ U.S. Coast Guard and Navy Supervisor of Salvage (SupSalv) resources performed their missions in an excellent manner and integrated very well with industry resources.

- ❖ Strong leadership provided by the Unified Command and a single well-equipped and integrated Incident Management Team successfully managed this simulated oil spill which crossed two Captain of the Port Zones.

- ❖ Mutual aid provided by ARCO Marine and their National Response Team contributed significantly to the successful response. This proved to be a very valuable resource of trained personnel, especially as it related to the Joint Information Center. In addition, local knowledge provided primarily by RCAC's was incorporated into the response.

- ❖ The Crisis Management Team and National Incident Command added value to the response. Strong leadership and cooperation overcame organizational differences and operational philosophies.

- ❖ The video teleconferences with the U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, members of the Congressional staff and National Response Team in Washington, D.C. were very effective in communicating incident status, response priorities and requests for assistance.

- ❖ A Day 5 Incident Action Plan was developed and approved during the exercise. In addition, an 11-month detailed General Plan was also developed and presented.

- ❖ Response ™, logistical support software, successfully captured and managed the immense amount of data required for a response of this magnitude.

- ❖ A complex, multi-stakeholder Joint Information Center was assembled for a spill response (drill or real life). The JIC was effectively integrated and worked well as a team to deliver a comprehensive communication strategy.

- ❖ The technology demonstrated in the televised interactive community briefing was outstanding. This combined with the exercise web page has set a new standard for community outreach.

Issues

The following significant issues resulted from the exercise, each of which will be examined further for possible improvements.

- There was a lack of clarity regarding the roles and responsibilities between the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) and National Incident Commander, as it is described in the National Contingency Plan and Commandant SONS Instruction.

- The USCG SONS Instruction did not provide adequate guidance for the integration of the responsible party and state into the USCG National Incident Command (NIC), with their differing crisis management response organizations, philosophies, roles and responsibilities. There needs to be a better understanding among the principals in a SONS response of the organizational objectives, functions, structure, roles, responsibilities and specific interactions to accomplish the response objectives in a highly efficient manner.

- The CMT/NIC identified certain issues which may provide an opportunity for additional pre-planning at the national, state, local and industry levels, including port closure and re-opening, dispersant use and public concern, Jones Act waiver process, disaster declaration, beach set-asides, incident investigation and mutual aid response resources.

- Joint Information Center support of the CMT/NIC must be evaluated further to determine the best method to provide necessary services to this senior level of the organization.

- The initial Day 5 Incident Action Plan did not sufficiently address the UC objectives for developing a Western Alaska response strategy.

- Response ™ software requires refinements to meet ICS Section specific needs, and also must provide more robust redundancies to avoid interruptions to the system.

- Storage units deployed in Chenega Bay were demonstrated to be recyclable; however, the decanting ability was found to be lacking due to a shortage of equipment, such as water paste, measuring devices, scupper plugs, etc. This issue is currently being resolved independently by ADEC and Alyeska/SERVS.

- The fishing vessel database maintained by SERVS contained some outdated and incorrect information.

Summary

- Cascade of Additional Spill Response Resources: The exercise tested the industry's and the National Response System's ability to augment the local spill response equipment with out-of-region resources to minimize the consequences of a major oil spill in Prince William Sound. The arrival on scene and deployment of OSRL equipment from England, MSRC equipment from California, Alaska Clean Seas' barge from the North Slope, USCG vessels, aircraft and equipment from Alaska and Seattle, Navy Supervisor Salvage equipment from Anchorage and fishing vessels from PWS clearly demonstrated this capability exists and works.

- CMT/NIC Organization: The exercise tested the ability to develop a crisis management/ national response level organization that could "add value" to the spill response efforts. Recognizing the role that high level industry and government officials must fill in major oil spills, the objective was to ensure they are provided a position and responsibilities that complements the ICS Unified Command System that is focused on initiating and managing the spill response. Although the CMT/NIC organization was only stood up for one day, it quickly developed into an organization that focused on addressing the strategic, media and political issues with the objective of supporting the FOSC and Unified Command. In doing so, they set out to allow the Unified Command to focus on the ongoing field operations that minimized the impacts of the oil spill on the environment. The fragmented nature of the CMT/NIC (i.e., CG, State and BP separate command posts) requires further attention. While there is much room for improvement, the CMT/NIC organizational concept was proven sound and added value.

- External Communications: Another important objective of a major spill response is ensuring accurate and timely information is provided to the public. The JIC established in Valdez was very effective in this regard; however, there was somewhat of a disconnect with response to information flow and coordination with the Anchorage CMT/NIC organization. Since one of the primary roles of the CMT/NIC is media/government/political relations, the JIC needs to be adequately integrated into the CMT/NIC organization to support this function. The establishment of a central JIC with branches at other locations as needed should be explored to ensure that accurate, complete, consistent and timely information is provided to all media and public contacts. Additionally, the State's "Spill Web Page" was an excellent medium for providing comprehensive, graphical and updated information to the public and stakeholders.

- Information/Data Exchange: The exercise demonstrated that the tremendous amount of information flowing from a major oil spill response needs to be controlled, vetted and shared at the CMT/NIC. The numerous systems developed by industry and agencies needs to be better linked and coordinated among the CMT/NIC.

Please see Section V of this report for more detailed discussion of the previously mentioned accomplishments and issues.

Following the publication of the Quick Report, one-on-one interviews were conducted with nineteen key participants to further analyze, discuss and develop recommendations concerning exercise accomplishments and issues. The results of this further analysis and subsequent recommendations are contained in this Final Report.

III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW

The primary objective of this exercise was to successfully demonstrate that "out-of-region" response equipment can be transported to Prince William Sound (PWS) to meet the state of Alaska's response planning standard. Additional objectives were added to accommodate a multi-day oil spill response training exercise for BP's Incident Management Team (IMT), Business Support Team (BST) and Crisis Management Team (CMT).

The U.S. Coast Guard took this opportunity to also exercise its Spill of National Significance (SONS) protocols. A Spill of National Significance is a rare catastrophic spill which greatly exceeds the response capabilities at the local and regional level. As defined by the National Contingency Plan, it is a spill that due to its severity, size, location, actual or potential impact on the public health and welfare or the environment, or the necessary response effort is so complex, that it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local and responsible party resources to clean up the spill. The SONS protocols add a higher level to the response structure for strategic direction and support.

This was the second Spill of National Significance (SONS) exercise conducted in the United States and the first led by industry. The previous exercise was held in Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. on September 16-18, 1997.

Although this was a SONS drill, it should be noted that the emphasis in Alaska, since 1989, has been to require industry to gear up for a worst case incident. Industry has responded by putting into place what is considered the best response capability in the world. The reality is it will take the combined efforts of the responsible party, the response community, State and Coast Guard to do the job. The government will be in an oversight mode while augmenting the cleanup when appropriate.

Exercise Development

Exercise development was overseen by a joint exercise Design Team consisting primarily of representatives from BP, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), United States Coast Guard (USCG), Alyeska/SERVS, ARCO Marine and PWS RCAC. The Design Team established overall objectives and subobjectives, approved the basic scenario and scope of play, and identified the exercise development organization.

Under the direction of the Design Team, a Control Team completed final development of the exercise. In addition to the primary organizations, the Control Team included participants from the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the USCG National Strike Force Coordination Center. Utilizing the exercise objectives and a hierarchical approach, the Control Team worked through a planning process to develop the following materials:

- Expectations of success for each subobjective (see Appendix B),

- Issues necessary to evaluate the objectives and expectations (see Appendix C),
- Injects for each issue to be role-played, if the issue did not occur naturally during play, and
- Script, which established the chronological order for the injects.

In summary, for this exercise there were 24 subobjectives, 82 expectations, 50 primary and secondary issues and over 250 scripted injects.

Exercise Objectives

The joint Design Team established the following general exercise objectives.

- Demonstrate the ability to deploy and operate out-of-region resources as designated by the Prince William Sound (PWS) Core Plan planning guidelines.

- Demonstrate the ability of the responsible party and Unified Command (UC) to effectively manage a sustained response to an Alaska SONS originating in Prince William Sound.

- Demonstrate the ability to incorporate and effectively utilize advanced oil spill response technologies to support the UC and Incident Management Team (IMT).

- Demonstrate the ability of the responsible party, state and National Incident Command (NIC) to effectively direct a sustained response to a SONS in Alaska.

- Demonstrate the ability to implement an integrated Joint Information Center (JIC) model for a SONS.

- Assess the effectiveness of the various response contingency plans of the responsible party, state and federal levels to adequately address the issues and support the response personnel for a SONS originating in Prince William Sound. (See Appendix D for a list of plans being exercised).

- Maximize the ability of the participants and stakeholders to receive certification and credit for participation in the training and exercise programs.

In summary, all of the exercise objectives were successfully completed. Specific accomplishments and issues are identified and discussed in Section V of this report.

Exercise Preparation

State contingency plan guidelines require that out-of-region resources arrive within 72 hours after the responsible party initiates notification and identifies that they are needed. In the drill, this need was established by 11:15 AM on Day 1. In order to evaluate this primary exercise objective, it was determined that the exercise would begin after the scheduled arrival of this equipment on Day 4, 72 hours after the need for out-of-region resources was established. This

Day 4 delayed start necessitated that a significant amount of preparations be completed prior to the actual exercise. In addition, many other major accomplishments were achieved prior to the exercise, which included the following:

- A joint BP/ADEC/USCG safety risk assessment for the exercise was conducted, which contributed toward an injury-free exercise.

- Meetings were held with the IMT and CMT to tabletop and discuss actions which would have taken place in the first 72 hours of this simulated incident. These sessions provided an excellent opportunity to establish working relationships and thoroughly discuss issues.

- A 33-page scenario was developed by Alyeska/SERVS. BP/ADEC/USCG and PWS RCAC further developed the scenario with actual teams conducting tabletop discussions to incorporate the actions which would have been taken by the participating organizations in the first 72 hours.

- An Incident Action Plan was prepared for implementation on the day of the exercise which contained all essential components, including Incident Objectives, Site Safety & Medical Plans, Incident Organization and over 300 ICS 204 Division Assignment forms.

- Environmental truth developed background information, including permits (dispersant use, in-situ burning, land use, wildlife hazing, capture and treatment), plans (decanting, on-shore cleanup, wildlife, waste and decontamination), and environmental data (trajectory, mass balance, shoreline oiling survey status and storage inventories).

- Logistics developed and pre-planned extensive Support Modules, including but not limited to, staging areas, warehouses, load-out areas, on-water solid waste collection, waste storage facilities, food supply, fuel and lubricants re-supply, communications, camp and personnel transportation. Each module included specific equipment lists, available resources and facilities, vendors and layout drawings.

- Participant training was conducted and included general and specific subjects such as, Skill Enhancement and Leadership Seminars (SEALS), Incident Command System (through I-400), Area Command, Crisis Management, External Affairs/JIC, Response ™ software, ATOM Model (trajectory), Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Team (SCAT), Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA), Environmental Unit and Hazwoper.

Exercise Play

The three exercise components – deployment of out-of-region resources, command post drill of the Incident Management Team in Valdez and the tabletop and workshop for the Crisis Management Team/National Incident Command in Anchorage – were begun on September 18 and completed on September 23, 1998 as follows. (See also Appendix E for the Exercise Schedule).

- Equipment Deployment - Calls to initiate the response of out-of-region resources were made at 8:00 AM from BP Alaska's offices on September 18, 1998. MSRC equipment landed in Cordova from Oakland at approximately 9:45 AM on September 19, 1998. From there, it was off-loaded and trucked to the dock. OSRL equipment arrived in Anchorage from Southampton, England at approximately 11:00 AM also on September 19, 1998. OSRL equipment was offloaded and trucked to the Seward dock. Prior to the call-out, Alaska Clean Seas' mini-barge was also trucked to Valdez from the North Slope.

Fig. 1 – OSRL out-of-region resources being unloaded at the Anchorage airport. *Courtesy of SONS exercise photography team.*

Fig. 2 - Oil spill responders unload skimming equipment in preparation for deployment on water near Cordova in Prince William Sound. *Courtesy of SONS exercise photography team.*

On September 20, 1998 MSRC equipment in Cordova was loaded out onto the SERVS 500-2 barge. Since in reality the 500-2 would not have been available due to prior deployment, a survey of available fish tenders was made in Cordova. It was determined that two tenders were available. One of these was inspected by BP personnel and the tender was found to be suitable for transporting out-of-region equipment and deploying it at the leading edge of the oil. Fishing vessels and barge 500-2 in Cordova transited the Sound to Sawmill Bay for the actual equipment deployment. OSRL equipment in Seward was loaded directly onto fishing vessels.

Fig. 3 – The U.S. Coast Guard participated in the on-water booming operations with its Vessel-Operated Skimming System, or VOSS. *Courtesy of SONS exercise photography team.*

Fig. 4 – U.S. Navy oil-skimming vessel is placed in the water at Resurrection Bay near Seward, Alaska. *Courtesy of SONS exercise photography team.*

On September 21, 1998 the equipment deployment began following a safety and operations briefing. Equipment in Seward transited to Resurrection Bay and response crews deployed one near-shore task force. In Sawmill Bay, one near-shore task force was deployed (See Appendix F). In addition, the USCG high endurance cutter MELLON acted as a command and control platform while directing air traffic. A USCG C-130 aircraft with an Airborne Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) flew a simulated dispersant spraying sortie. USCG Buoy Tenders SWEETBRIER and IRONWOOD also deployed Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems (VOSS) in Sawmill and Resurrection Bays respectively. And the 110' USCG patrol boat MUSTANG was utilized to enforce the Safety Zone.

Fig. 5 - Skimming operations are underway on Resurrection Bay near Seward, Alaska. *Courtesy of SONS exercise photography team.*

Fig. 6 – A C130 aircraft sprays dispersants during SONS exercise. *Courtesy of SONS exercise photography team.*

- Valdez Command Post - On September 21, 1998 all participants received their player handbooks and briefing. This was followed by a simulated Unified Command (UC) press briefing. The remainder of the Incident Management Team (IMT) began the exercise at 6:00 AM on September 22, 1998. During the course of this day, the Unified Command directed the response and briefed the CMT/NIC. All IMT sections responded appropriately to incident requirements and Control injects. In addition, the UC conducted a statewide televised community briefing with simultaneous interactive communications provided in Valdez, Chenega, Cordova and Kodiak.

  On September 23, 1998, Planning presented the approved Day 5 Incident Action Plan (IAP) and an eleven-month General Plan. This was followed by a facilitated self-evaluation and debrief.

Fig. 7 – The integrated BP, ARCO, Maritime Overseas Corp., ADEC and USCG Command Post in the Valdez Civic Center. *Courtesy of SONS exercise photography team.*

- Anchorage CMT/NIC - The Crisis Management Team and National Incident Command participants received their player handbooks and briefing on September 21, 1998. Play began at 6:00 AM on September 22, 1998. During the day, the CMT/NIC provided strategic direction and support to the UC and IMT while addressing issues of national importance. The NIC held video teleconferences with the USCG Commandant, members of the Congressional staff and National Response Team (NRT).

  On September 23, 1998 the CMT/NIC were briefed on the Day 5 IAP and General Plan, and conducted a simulated press briefing. Players also participated in a facilitated self-evaluation and debrief. In the afternoon, the CMT/NIC senior leadership and the Unified Commanders from Valdez were involved in a SONS Workshop to further discuss exercise feedback and

open issues. In Washington, D.C., the National Response Team convened at the Department of Energy and the Commandant and Congressional staff members met at USCG Headquarters. The Commandant and NRT were briefed by the CMT/NIC on September 23rd.

IV. EVALUATION PROCESS

The purpose of the exercise evaluation was to reinforce activities that went well and to identify opportunities for improvement. Input was solicited from players, controllers and evaluators utilizing the following process:

- Each player was requested to complete and submit a Participant Critique, which included a numeric rating system. These were analyzed and reviewed by the Evaluation Team. (See Appendix G).

- Players, controllers and evaluators participated in a debrief immediately following the exercise. This facilitated self-evaluation developed lists of items that went well and those that need improvement. These were reviewed by the members of the Evaluation Team.

- Evaluators, selected for their experience and expertise from a diverse set of organizations, including industry, state regulators from Alaska, California, Texas and Washington, U.S. Coast Guard, PWS RCAC and the Independent Tanker Owner Pollution Federation (ITOPF), observed assigned parts of the exercise and completed a detailed evaluation protocol. In addition, each evaluator provided their own observations and recommendations, as well. This input was reviewed by members of the Evaluation Team.

- A series of breakout sessions leading to a SONS Workshop were utilized to define and address certain national issues. Issues and actions resulting from this forum were reviewed by members of the Evaluation Team.

- Key issues identified by the Evaluation Team were addressed further in one-on-one after action interviews with key participants in the exercise, following publication of the Quick Report.

- The Evaluation Team has produced a joint BP/ADEC/USCG Final Report. The first report or "Quick Report" provided a rapid look at the exercise and most significant evaluation findings provide Recommendations and supercedes the 'Quick Report'. It should be noted that some clarifications and changes have been made to the original text in the "Quick Report". The "Final Report" provides a more in-depth and insightful look into these findings.

Reports have been distributed through each participant's respective organization. The Coast Guard also plans to prepare a supplementary report to capture USCG specific costs and other data. In addition, the SONS exercise Final Report can be viewed on the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation website at http://www.state.ak.us/dec/sons98/.

V. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ISSUES

General

This exercise was developed and evaluated in accordance with the strict objectives set by the Design Team. Therefore, this discussion will be formatted around those same **objectives**. Additional comments will be included, where appropriate. (See Appendix B).

It was agreed by all members of the joint Evaluation Team that the exercise objectives were met. The following discussion is intended to capture and acknowledge significant accomplishments and to identify issues for further analysis, evaluation and improvement. Both accomplishments and issues listed here are intended to further improve contingency plans and response capabilities.

Objective 1 - Out of Region Response Resources Deployment and Training

Demonstrate the ability to deploy and operate out-of-region resources as designated by the PWS Core Plan planning guidelines.

1.1 Demonstrate the ability to locate, transport and deploy out-of-region resources within the 72-hour planning guidelines for initial task forces, by actually transporting and deploying a representative sample of this equipment.

A. Accomplishments:

1. There were no injuries or serious incidents during any phase of the deployment. A joint safety risk assessment and safety briefing prior to and during the exercise contributed to this success.

2. All out-of-region resources arrived at their designated destinations in substantially less time than the planning standard of 72 hours. MSRC equipment arrived from California in approximately 26 hours, and OSRL equipment arrived from England in approximately 28 hours. This left considerable time for off-loading, load-out and deployment. Alaska Clean Seas' mini-barge also arrived from the North Slope in Valdez.

3. Ground transportation of equipment and load-out went well in all locations.

4. Near shore task forces, including three strike teams each, were deployed as planned.

5. Players quickly and successfully adapted to unpredictable weather constraints and an unexpected problem posed by an Alaska ferry moored at the Cordova dock, where equipment was to be loaded out.

6. Performance of the fishing vessels and crews was commendable. In addition, this was an excellent hands-on training opportunity for those vessels involved.

7. Storage capability was demonstrated by the deployment of 3 mini-barges and one towable storage bladder. Each of these was filled, shifted to Barge 500-2, unloaded simultaneously and then support vessels were available to move them back into service. In addition, one mini-barge was decanted. These procedures, along with a representative sample of equipment, demonstrated that sustained 12-hour operations were possible.

B. Issues:

1. While the objective to transport and deploy a representative sample of out-of-region resources was met, an issue was raised that future exercises should consider the appropriateness of skimmers for the type of oil and weather conditions expected to be encountered.

2. The buddy system was to be used as a safety precaution for all fishing vessels. However, one vessel experienced engine trouble and was left alone, although in constant radio communications. The vessel did eventually repair the engine problem and traveled to the deployment location.

3. Storage units deployed in Chenega Bay were demonstrated to be recyclable; however, the decanting ability was found to be lacking due to a shortage of equipment, such as water paste, measuring devices, scupper plugs, etc. This issue is currently being resolved by ADEC and Alyeska/SERVS independently.

4. It was suggested that the hydraulic system on Barge 500-2 should have sufficient capacity to operate multiple on-board systems and provide redundancy. Funds have already been approved and work is to be completed by year-end.

5. The transit time of the Alaska Clean Seas mini-barge could not be verified due to a possible early departure from its assigned exercise location prior to notification. However, upon further investigation, transit time of the Alaska Clean Seas mini-barge to Valdez was determined to be acceptable, and no further action is required.

1.2 Conduct training for the fishing vessel fleet on the strategies and techniques for forming initial near shore task forces.

A. Accomplishments:

1. Tier III fishing vessel training was conducted as planned.

2. Fishing vessels performed very well during the exercise. Training was further enhanced by this hands-on exercise.

B. Issues:

1. It was noted that it may be difficult to conduct consistent training quickly at multiple locations.

1.3 Demonstrate the ability to use Tier 3 fishing vessels for deployment of initial out-of-region task forces by identifying, inspecting and training a representative group.

A. Accomplishments:

1. The four Tier III fishing vessels were exercised and they performed well, using various response positions and boom configurations. Rotation of vessels provided the opportunity for each crew to attempt the various procedures.

B. Issues:

1. The Tier III fishing vessel database contains some incorrect and outdated information.

2. One Tier III vessel did not appear suitable for skimming operations. However, it was understood that this vessel could be utilized for other duties.

3. The process for activating Tier III fishing vessels using designated Administrators did not appear to be clearly understood.

1.4 Demonstrate the ability to locate, transport and deploy federal response resources and personnel in an integrated manner, by actually deploying the following equipment.

A. Accomplishments:

1. Federal resources were deployed as planned and operated effectively, including two VOSS's deployed from the USCG buoy tenders SWEETBRIER and IRONWOOD, one SupSalv Marco skimmer, one C-130 with an Airborne Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS), one 110' CG Cutter MUSTANG to enforce the Safety Zone and the high endurance Coast Guard Cutter (CGC) MELLON for tactical command and control. Also, federal resources integrated well with industry assets.

B. Issues:

1. Two MSO personnel would be required on CGC MELLON, one on the bridge and one in Combat Information Center (CIC). Twenty-four hour operations would require four persons.

2. Consider providing transponders to USCG and industry response vessels for asset tracking via Vessel Tracking Center (VTC) to enhance safety and asset management.

3. Only one full spectrum VHF FM radio located on the bridge on CGC MELLON was available for communicating with response vessels. For large, multi unit spill responses where the cutter is interacting with the commercial industry on their working frequencies, more flexible FHF-FM communications capabilities are required.

4. Additional training of USCG personnel engaged in operating spill recovery equipment on decontamination and stocking appropriate personnel protective equipment onboard was recommended.

5. Need to improve air traffic control, as one aircraft was allowed to approach in the vicinity of the Coast Guard C-130 aircraft involved in the simulated dispersant operations and was not given clear instructions on where to divert. This situation was partially attributable to the fact that air radar is not very effective in the PWS terrain. In addition, the plan called for Barge 500-2 to control the CG C-130 aircraft simulating the use of aerial dispersants. However, control of this aircraft was passed to the Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter without explanation just before the aircraft arrived on scene. This left little time to plan the approach and employment of all involved aircraft.

Objective 2 - Incident Management/Unified Command

Demonstrate the ability of the responsible party and Unified Command to effectively manage a sustained response to an Alaska SONS originating in Prince William Sound.

2.1 Develop a 72-hour Incident Action Plan for Day 4 and effectively transfer response management from Alyeska to BP.

A. Accomplishments:

1. A comprehensive Day 4 Incident Action Plan (IAP) was developed during the design phase that included strategic objectives, environmental priorities, field deployment of resources and logistical support requirements. The IAP included over 300 ICS 204 Field Assessment forms and all necessary supporting documentation, including plans and permits.

B. Issues:

1. ICS 204 Field Assignment forms seemed to lack sufficient goals and necessary procedural information to carry out the assigned tasks. These forms did not appear to provide the tactical objectives, operational boundaries or appropriate procedures to follow. (See additional comments under Objective 2.3 – Operations).

2. Consider the mechanism to effectively communicate essential information to the field from an extremely large document the size of the IAP for this incident.

2.2 Develop and conduct training for BP's Incident Management Team (IMT) and integrated local, state and federal personnel on activation, deployment and sustaining out-of-region resources.

A. Accomplishments:

1. Training was conducted in advance of the exercise for IMT representatives from BP, ADEC, USCG, Alyeska, ARCO Marine and PWS RCAC, among other response partners. Training opportunities were also very valuable in developing working relationships and cooperation among the team members.

2. In addition to team training, specific courses were conducted for ICS (through ICS-400), External Affairs, Response ™ software, ATOM Model (trajectory), Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Team (SCAT), National Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA), Environmental Unit and HAZWOPER, among others.

B. Issues:

1. Some players were observed to have difficulty with technical and communications systems, such as computer networking and conferencing, due to a lack of training.

2.3 Demonstrate the ability of the Unified Command to effectively manage an incident that involves more than one COTP zone.

A. Accomplishments:

1. Strong leadership was provided by the Unified Command. The UC worked extremely well together setting priorities and strategic direction in a consensus fashion. This coordinated effort was amply demonstrated during the press briefing

2. One Unified Command and integrated Incident Management Team for two Captain of the Port (COTP) Zones was capable of effectively managing the incident, at least through Day 4. Although an incident of this magnitude required an extremely large integrated team, command and control was demonstrated.

3. Mutual aid provided by ARCO proved to be a valuable resource of additional trained personnel. Approximately 60 members of ARCO Marine's National Response Team integrated well into BP's organization and provided significant contributions, especially with regard to the Joint Information Center (JIC).

4. Planning meetings were well conducted and to the point. Meeting size was manageable (taking into consideration the training aspect) and resulted in the desired work products.

5. Operations exhibited good tactical decision-making and reacted well to actual events and control inputs. Local knowledge, including that provided by the representatives of the PWS RCAC, was utilized and contributed to this success. The effectiveness of deployed resources was periodically assessed, and assignments were revised as appropriate.

6. The command post facility was excellent and space concerns were resolved. It should be noted that the drill was held in the Valdez Civic Center rather than the SERVS' Valdez Emergency Operations Center (VEOC), due primarily to the large number of additional players in this SONS training exercise which exceeded the capacity of the VEOC. Infrastructure, such as communications and technology, were very good under exercise constraints (although not totally without problems) and had the capacity to be upgraded in a real event.

B. Issues:

1. There was substantial concern expressed by the Unified Command and MSO Anchorage personnel that the response to Western Alaska had not been sufficiently addressed in the Incident Action Plan for Day 5. A presentation the following morning on this subject overcame many of their concerns, but not all.

Unified Command and Staff

UC1 There is a need to clarify the role of the Unified Command in relation to the National Incident Command. When asked in separate press conferences "who is in charge," the FOSC said he was and the National Incident commander said he was. While this never became an issue which affected the response, it may have caused some public confusion. In addition, there should be more frequent interaction between the UC and NIC. This is somewhat dependent on communications capabilities provided.

UC2 The Unified Command did not allocate space and time for private meetings and strategic planning. When not in meetings, the UC was in the command post constantly faced with a barrage of personnel needing information and decisions to be made. It was beneficial to the team for the UC to be so readily available and in tune to the response. However, strategic thinking and long-term planning require some solitude.

UC3 The role of Deputy Incident Commanders was unclear and they were underutilized. In this exercise, deputies did not have clearly defined authority that tied back to the IMT organization. The RP deputies were assigned to liaison with the Valdez and Anchorage COTP zones, which did not directly correlate to the functional ICS Sections. This left them somewhat disconnected from the response team. Also, some deputies accompanied Incident Commanders to meetings,

leaving a leadership void in the command post. Deputy Incident Commanders did, however, provide a very valuable community liaison role during the exercise.

UC4 The command post location should be evaluated from a long-term perspective in the General Plan. The oil had moved a significant distance to the south exiting the Sound, such that the command post would not have been centrally located or convenient to the response. It was a reported lesson learned from the Exxon Valdez spill that Anchorage or Seward should be considered in the future as preferable command post locations following the initial response to a major incident. Any changes that might result from this issue may require formal amendments to the approved tanker plan.

UC5 Section Chiefs frequently did not designate a deputy to assume their role when they were absent from the command post, such as to attend meetings. In addition, when Section Chiefs returned from meetings, they did not brief the Section on the current status of the incident and any decisions made that impact the Section.

Operations

Op.1 Operations had difficulty plotting future tactical options and decisions, due to a lack of available maps and charts. This was made worse by the lack of an accurate and current picture of the response. Situational displays in the information center adjacent to Operations were outdated and did not reflect the current resource deployments.

Op.2 The tanker was left unattended with no tugs standing by. The tugs were used for deployment of response equipment. This may have been a resource tracking issue or a miscommunication between Operations and Truth, as additional tugs were available. Upon further investigation, it was determined that the vessel was hard aground and there was little to no chance of further movement. In addition, the tugs used for deployment of response equipment were available in the immediate area to assist the tanker, should it have been needed. The strategic objectives and tactical deployments were approved by the Unified Command and were based on sound judgement in accordance with the exercise scenario.

Op.3 A prioritized list of environmentally sensitive sites for Day 5 was needed sooner for the timely development of operations personnel and resource deployment plans.

Op.4 Field Assignment forms (ICS 204) lacked tactical objectives and procedures. Exercise 204's allocated resources but did not clearly state what to do, where to do it, and how to do it. For example, a 204 for a shoreline cleanup task force did not state the objective (e.g., gross decontamination or final polishing), the operational boundaries (e.g., xyz cove), and procedures to be followed (e.g., SCAT instructions, such as low pressure high volume cold water flush). These instructions may be abbreviated by referring or attaching elements from Contingency Plans; but keep in mind beach supervisors do not have access to these plans in the field.

Planning

Pl.1 While the Section was successful in developing a Day 5 Incident Action Plan which was approved, there were some deficiencies that had to be overcome. It was felt by the Unified Command that the first draft of the plan had not adequately addressed their strategic objectives, namely developing a strategy for deploying resources to Western Alaska. This would include changes to the management structure to accommodate an expanding area of impact. In addition, tactical decisions made early in the day to reassign certain response assets were not captured in the plan. The IAP was later revised to address these concerns.

Pl.2 The situation status boards frequently did not reflect the most current status maps depicting oil trajectories, status and equipment resource deployments. There did not seem to be one centralized method for updating these displays on a frequent periodic basis.

Pl.3 In general, the number of people and complexity of the section's organization appeared to be too large and bureaucratic. This prevented the section from adapting quickly to changing incident conditions, tactical decisions and resource deployments.

Pl.4 The size of the Incident Action Plan necessitated by an event of this magnitude was overwhelming. Review and approval of the plan by federal and state authorities was eased by integrating agency personnel during the plan development, and by the summary of changes from Day 4 to Day 5 provided by Planning to the Unified Command. An effective method to communicate essential plan elements to the field was not exercised, however, and remained an unresolved issue.

Note: (See Objective 2.5 for comments on the General Plan)

Logistics

(See discussion for Objective 2.6)

Finance

(See discussion for Objective 2.7)

2.4 Demonstrate the ability to integrate state, federal and industry personnel and optimize their utilization.

A. Accomplishments:

1. Integration of personnel into a unified Incident Management Team was excellent.

Teamwork and cooperation among organizations significantly enhanced the overall response. Specifically, ARCO's mutual aid assistance, local knowledge provided by RCAC representatives and specialized response knowledge from Alyeska/SERVS, to name a few, all significantly contributed to this successful response effort.

2. Integration of local knowledge, including Regional Citizen Advisory Council (RCAC) personnel, also contributed to a more effective response. This was directly attributable to the trust and cooperation developed in the pre-exercise community outreach briefings, training and tabletop meetings and shown by all.

2.5 Demonstrate the ability to conduct long-range strategic planning by the preparation of an ICS General Plan.

A. Accomplishments:

1. A detailed eleven-month General Plan was developed that addressed long-term tactical and logistical support needs. The plan, along with the Logistics Support Modules, would have provided the necessary planning to support a long-term response.

B. Issues:

1. It was not clearly understood by all who approves the General Plan, the Unified Command or the CMT/NIC. In addition, the CMT/NIC discussed but did not resolve what their contribution to the plan should be, how it will be provided and how the plan will be used in Anchorage.

2. The General Plan did not attempt to source the resources necessary to implement the plan, nor address the details necessary for demobilization.

2.6 Demonstrate the ability to effectively manage logistical requirements for a sustained response with out-of-region resources and integration of federal/state procurement and resources.

A. Accomplishments:

1. Logistics Support Modules developed for the exercise were outstanding. These modules were well conceived and provided essential pre-planned details necessary to demonstrate the ability to support a sustained response.

2. Logistics worked well with Operations and Planning to activate, assign, and support resource requirements.

B. Issues:

1. There seemed to be confusion between Logistics and Operations on how the requisition process worked within the Response ™ software. In addition, the Resource Status Unit did not seem to have a current picture of procurement status.

2. Resource procurement orders frequently did not request cost data from the vendor. This information is essential for the Finance Section to track and control costs.

3. There did not seem to be a process to periodically update resource data integrity and status information contained in the Response ™ software.

4. The players recommended continued efforts to further improve the process, forms, modules and integration into the overall response Sections.

2.7 Demonstrate the ability to capture, compile, project and report cost documentation.

A. Accomplishments:

1. The Finance Section mounted a solid proactive claims response, with local offices and decentralized authority for claims administration and settlement. It is believed that this would have minimized claims costs to the greatest extent possible.

2. The Finance Section was able to capture detailed pre-drill costs through Response ™ and provide a summary on an Excel spreadsheet through Day 3.

B. Issues:

1. Finance information necessary to complete their cost control objectives was not readily available. When Response ™ experienced a loss of data and Day 4 entry was incomplete, it was very difficult to compile Day 4 costs and other forward-looking projections, such as the General Plan.

Objective 3 - Advanced Oil Spill Response Technologies

Demonstrate the ability to incorporate and effectively utilize advanced oil spill response technologies to support the UC and Incident Management Team.

3.1 Demonstrate the effectiveness of Response ™ software to support logistical management of response resources.

A. Accomplishments:

1. There was general agreement among players and evaluators alike that Response ™

was a valuable response tool. It is likely that a response of this magnitude could only be accomplished effectively utilizing software of this type.

B. Issues:

1. There was also general agreement that the software needs to be further refined to meet the specific needs of the various sections.

2. There did not appear to be a system to update and validate the integrity of the data inputted into the system.

3. Use of the system will require additional training and administrative support. Even though the software had been preloaded with data for Days 1-3, personnel were not able to keep up with data entry of the information generated on Day 4. In addition, many response team members did not have the knowledge or time to effectively utilize the system.

4. The procurement system was not understood by many others outside of Logistics. This caused confusion and slowed the requisition process.

5. It was observed that a back-up system for Response ™ is essential. At one point during the exercise, the software experienced difficulty that affected the entire response. Although the system recovered, had it not, it would have been extremely difficult to sustain the response.

3.2 Validate the Logistics Support Modules for identifying support resources needed for deployment of additional out-of-region resource task forces and integrated federal resources.

A. Accomplishments:

1. The Logistics Support Modules were an excellent tool in meeting the long-term support needs of the response. Without these pre-planned support modules, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to provide the support requirements for a response of this magnitude.

B. Issues:

1. The players in this section suggested that the effort continue to evaluate and refine these modules.

3.3 Demonstrate the ability to implement a resource tracking system for resources deployed to the field.

A. Accomplishments:

1. The Response ™ software provided a framework system to accomplish this objective. This system provided the necessary support to develop the Day 5 IAP and ICS 204 Field Assignment forms. In addition, Operations personnel had an intimate knowledge of resource deployments.

B. Issues:

1. As a result of a problem with the backup hardware of the Response ™ system added for the exercise, Response ™ was unable to print or display a resource summary or resource allocation. In addition, displays maintained by the Resource Status Unit in the information center were not consistent with actual field deployments (Truth).

3.4 Demonstrate the ability to develop an information technology (IT) strategy to support UC and the IMT system and information requirements for effective response management and communications, including external audiences.

A. Accomplishments:

1. A televised community briefing was simultaneously broadcast throughout the state of Alaska utilizing the Alaska Rural Communications System (ARCS). In addition, the four communities of Chenega Bay, Cordova, Kodiak and Valdez were provided with an interactive link. Questions were then taken by the Unified Command from each community. The technical capabilities demonstrated by these briefings is an important step in developing new avenues to improved community outreach.

2. The Unified Command exercise website was another example of a significant new technical achievement to aid in communicating with external audiences. This was the first time that this forum has been used in an exercise to provide response information to the public.

3. Telecommunications provided in the IMT command post was excellent under cost constraints dictated by the exercise artificiality.

4. The wireless local area network and computers provided for use in the IMT command post was exceptional.

5. Once the USCG e-mail and data exchange system was fully operational, it provided seamless data network for multiple Coast Guard sites that were not collocated. The data network provided mail, file, and printer sharing for USCG personnel throughout parts of Alaska.

B. Issues:

1. There remains some concern about reliability of the broadcast capability due to telecommunications failures which occurred on multiple occasions prior to the exercise, and its lack of area-wide capability.

2. Conference call arrangements for the Unified Command to brief the National Incident Command was not operational until the last briefing of the day. When used, the conference call capability improved the briefing results by an order of magnitude.

3. The USCG e-mail and data exchange system between Valdez and Anchorage was not fully operational until the end of the day. USCG relied on third party contracting and were not given priority for assistance.

4. Additional training is needed to make end users familiar and proficient in the technical systems provided.

5. Although there were numerous technology successes, there is a need to establish a joint system or electronic links between participating organizations to efficiently share timely information while maintaining proprietary and confidential information.

Objective 4 - Crisis Management/Area Command

Demonstrate the ability of the responsible party and area command to effectively direct a sustained response to a Spill of National Significance (SONS) in Alaska.

4.1 Demonstrate the ability of the Crisis Management Team (CMT) and National Incident Command (NIC) to direct and lead a SONS incident that involves more than one Captain of the Port (COTP) zone.

A. Accomplishments:

1. The CMT/NIC was comprised of executives and officers of BP, ADEC and USCG. Good rapport was observed among Crisis Management Team and National Incident Command leaders. This further enhanced the commitment and cooperation between the three organizations' teams. It was felt that meetings between the three primary response organizations were vital to the success of the response.

2. Participants agreed that the CMT/NIC concept added value to the response. This was accomplished in two primary areas: (1.) assistance and support provided to the UC/IMT, and (2.) interface with senior organizational management and highly placed elected officials. The concept of a National Incident Commander and its counterpart state and corporate Crisis Managers was also viewed favorably by the Coast Guard Commandant, National Response Team, and Congressional attendees.

3. The video teleconferences with the USCG Commandant, members of the Congressional staff and the National Response Team were very effective in communicating incident status, requests for assistance and response priorities. Access to these principals ensures a rapid communication link between policymakers and responders.

B. Issues:

1. There still remain significant questions as to the most effective organizational model for the National Incident Command in a SONS event. Each CMT/NIC response organization maintained differing response organization formats and operational philosophies. At the outset, it was noted that BP's CMT was organized functionally around its normal corporate departments. ADEC was organized similarly, with emphasis on significant response issues. The Coast Guard's NIC was organized in a command and control fashion utilizing ICS. These differences did not lend the organizations to effective interaction or an understanding of each other's specific roles. It was noted that one structure will not fit all situations, therefore, flexibility must be an attribute of the USCG SONS Commandant Instruction and Protocols.

2. Similar to the organizational differences of BP, ADEC and the USCG, there was not total agreement on the mission of the CMT/NIC. BP and ADEC were more alike and viewed their role as primarily providing assistance to the UC and integrated IMT. Coast Guard defined the role of the NIC as follows: providing overall direction; providing support to the IMT; assisting with information flow, specifically as the national spokesperson; and monitoring the performance of the IMT. Despite these differences, the three organizations worked well together.

3. During the exercise, three adjacent spaces were provided for BP, ADEC and the USCG, simulating that they were in their own remotely located command posts in Anchorage office locations. Frequent meetings and necessary interaction would have made remotely located spaces impractical. Fewer meetings and interaction would have reduced the effectiveness of the response.

4. There also remains the issue of role clarity. The FOSC responded affirmatively when asked this question during a press briefing, as he probably should, based on the duties assigned by the National Contingency Plan. However, the National Incident Commander also responded positively when asked the same questions, which is consistent with the USCG SONS Commandant Instruction. This approach and message would likely cause confusion in the minds of the public.

5. The video teleconferences were perceived as a rapid, effective means of sharing information. Congressional staff has come to expect this form of communication. However, the technology is sufficiently new that equipment availability and compatibility is not assured in all cases in the future.

4.2 Develop and implement training for the CMT/NIC in their functional/organizational responsibilities and procedures.

A. Accomplishments:

1. Training and workshop sessions were provided in preparation for the exercise. These sessions ranged from crisis management to skill enhancement and leadership seminars. The training was well received and instrumental in establishing working relationships prior to the start of this Day 4 exercise. This periodic interaction between principles during the exercise planning stage built understanding and good relations between them.

B. Issues:

1. Individual CG roles and responsibilities, once these are further defined in the USCG SONS and state guidance, will require training for complete implementation.

2. Technical training in the use of communications and computer systems was observed to be needed.

4.3 Demonstrate the ability to effectively integrate the National Incident Command (NIC) with BP's Crisis Management Team (CMT).

A. Accomplishments:

1. Integration of the CMT/NIC leadership was effective in problem solving and consensus building. At the senior CMT/NIC level, each representative acted in a manner that assured and demonstrated seemless integration.

B. Issues:

1. Integration of the organizational teams was not observed. A breakdown in physical communications and the organizational differences mentioned earlier caused considerable confusion and impeded the ability of the three teams to work together effectively, cohesively and constructively on issues. Also, as previously mentioned, BP, ADEC and USCG were simulated to each be in their own Anchorage office spaces. There was a "common" room provided; however effective integration in this space was also not observed, with the exception of Logistics. While it is understood that there will be issues when integration is not appropriate (e.g., incident investigation), it was observed by the evaluators that organizational integration would have achieved numerous benefits. Much like the Unified Command and integrated IMT, integration at the CMT/NIC level would have aided in achieving greater organizational efficiency, utilization of subject experts, minimizing duplication of effort, improved information sharing and flow,

greater accuracy, consistency and timeliness of information and improved quality of products and services to name a few. To the credit of the CMT/NIC leadership, a consensus decision was made to integrate adhoc issue teams (e.g., "Tiger Teams"). This approach was successfully employed.

4.4 Demonstrate the ability of the CMT/NIC to provide assistance and support to the Unified Command (UC), including logistics for out-of-region resources.

A. Accomplishments:

1. The Unified Command felt that the CMT/NIC added value to the response by providing support and assistance. Most prominent were significant issues passed up to the CMT/NIC for interface with other agencies and eventual resolution.

B. Issues:

1. It is not currently a significant mission objective in the USCG SONS Commandant Instruction for the National Incident Command to provide logistical support to the UC or IMT.

4.5 Demonstrate the ability of the CMT/NIC to address external issues other than those normally associated with Unified Command or the Joint Information Center (JIC).

A. Accomplishments:

1. A list of exercise issues is shown in Appendix C. In general, the NIC/CMT were proactive in identifying these issues and addressing them. In most cases, emphasis remained strategic in nature and issues were prioritized.

2. Deputies were effective in meeting to assign Issues, obtain updates and keep actions moving.

B. Issues:

1. There was general agreement that many issues expected to arise in a large incident, such as this one, could be pre-planned in advance. This might take the form of updates to plans or internal procedures. Some such issues that were discussed included port closure and re-opening, dispersants, Jones Act waiver process, state and federal disaster declaration implications, incident investigation, beach set-asides, human resource needs, mutual aid response resources and NRDA. It should be kept in mind while preplanning these issues that any plan or procedure must provide flexibility to the responsible party and the federal and state commanders in order to deal with the unique circumstances of each event.

2. It was noted by evaluators that the process of identifying, prioritizing, assigning

and tracking issues could be improved. Selection of issues should be proactive, strategic and long-range. It was felt that additional information on long-range impacts would have aided this process. The General Plan may have at least partially fulfilled this need. Prioritizing issues and assignment would have been done better in an integrated organization to take full advantage of subject experts and the benefit of different perspectives. Deputies began to fill this role late in the day. Integrated ad hoc issue teams that were chartered for a particular issue or topic were discussed and briefly tested with noted success. Tracking could have been improved by establishing a joint situation status center which was adequately staffed and tasked with this responsibility.

4.6 Demonstrate the ability of the Regional Response Team (RRT) and National Response Team (NRT) to support and provide assistance to the NIC.

A. Accomplishments:

1. The CMT/NIC noted that the NRT liaisons were very effective in supporting the response.

2. The NIC video teleconferences with the NRT were observed to be very effective and useful to both organizations.

B. Issues:

1. The lines of communication between Coast Guard Headquarters, the NRT and their member agencies, RRT, and NIC need further development. Specifically, the role of each organizational element in relation to the others needs to be better defined in the SONS protocols. For instance, although the existing SONS protocol establishes a direct link from the NIC to the NRT, the NRT suggested that several of the tasks forwarded for their action could have been addressed by the RRT.

2. Tasks forwarded to the NRT for action should be assigned a priority and deadline for completion. Assigning an NRT liaison to Coast Guard Headquarters Incident Management Cell improved the flow of information between the NRT and Coast Guard. The exercise reinforced the need for an NRT protocol to address set-aside of impacted areas for scientific research.

Objective 5 - Joint Information Center Model

Demonstrate the ability to implement an integrated JIC Model for a SONS.

5.1 Demonstrate the ability to develop a system to allow the public and stakeholders to keep abreast of spill related issues and developments.

A. Accomplishments:

1. This was one of the largest Joint Information Centers (JIC) probably ever assembled for a spill response effort, with over 50 persons. The organization that was established in Valdez was consistent with the established JIC model. Agency and organization representatives were fully integrated into the JIC based on needs. Overall, the JIC was staffed and organized in a manner to effectively address the public's questions and concerns. The group worked extremely well together as a team.

2. The exercise web page was also effective in communicating with stakeholders. It was reported that the web page received over 800 "hits" during the exercise. The successful use of this format has set a high standard for future responses.

3. The JIC conducted three formal news conferences and press briefings as part of the exercise as follows:
    - Unified Command (9/21)
    - Environmental (9/22)
    - National Incident Command (9/23)

4. The JIC also issued 12 news releases, updates and announcements.

B. Issues:

1. One issue remaining was how best to support the information needs and role in media and public relations of the CMT/NIC. In this case the JIC was located in Valdez, and only a phone bank was assigned in Anchorage. However, prior to a CMT/NIC press brief, senior JIC personnel did go to Anchorage. The question is whether to have a separate JIC in Anchorage or to add another layer to the existing JIC to assist the CMT/NIC.

2. Limited staffing by ADEC and the RCAC minimized their involvement.

3. The technical team which was provided in Valdez following the initial press briefing was ineffective as communicators, due primarily to the technical content and language of their presentation. Further, the technical briefing interfered with the ability of media to obtain on-camera interviews with members of the Unified Command.

4. During the environmental briefing, it was apparent that participants were not fully aware of what the other speakers were going to say. This allowed the reporters to steer the session and to elicit some headline quotes.

5. The press briefing in Anchorage was less effective in understanding and addressing perception issues and local concerns. In addition, questions were not always answered or directed to the appropriate party.

6. While the web page was well received, the use of this forum raised some

procedural issues, such as the need for protocols to establish the lead administrator, content, update frequency, and required approval. These issues are similar to those originally addressed for print versions of this information released to the media by the JIC. In addition, there was considerable duplication of effort with multiple web pages being developed and administered by participating and stakeholder organizations. This may cause confusion to someone seeking information.

5.2 Demonstrate the ability to deploy video-teleconferencing capability to designated communities in order to provide incident updates and gather stakeholder concerns.

A. Accomplishments:

1. BP very successfully demonstrated the ability to conduct a live community briefing via televised interactive teleconference. The briefing was broadcast statewide using the Alaska Rural Communications System (ARCS). In addition, interactive communication was provided simultaneously to the communities of Chenega, Cordova, Kodiak and Valdez. Questions were then addressed from each community. This permitted Unified Commanders to remain near the command post and minimize critical travel time, while fulfilling their public communication obligations. Placement of BP Community Liaison Officers in each of the locations to facilitate the briefings was an essential part of this effort. This has set a new standard for community outreach.

Objective 6 - Contingency Plans

Assess the effectiveness of the various response contingency plans of the responsible party, state and federal agencies to adequately address the issues and support the response personnel for a SONS originating in Prince William Sound, Alaska.

6.1 Conduct a thorough exercise evaluation process to assess the effectiveness of various command levels and response teams to implement the applicable response and contingency plans.

A. Accomplishments:

1. The evaluation process was previously described in this report. The Quick Report was followed by in-depth interviews with key participants regarding their views of significant issues and possible alternatives for resolution.

2. Response teams appropriately implemented their contingency plans.

3. The exercise scenario threatened two COTP zones, thereby involving two Coast Guard Predesignated FOSC's. However, in order to remain consistent with the single FOSC requirements of section 300.140(b) of the National Contingency Plan and to align with the RP and State's view of the situation as being just "one

incident", the Coast Guard elected to form one Unified Command with the more-local FOSC at its head while integrating a number of members of the adjacent FOSC's staff (to ensure that the concerns of that jurisdiction were also represented). This arrangement was felt to work very well.

B. Issues:

1. Mutual aid agreements between Alaska co-ops did not appear to be formalized. Issues such as request/approval procedures, criteria for release, inventories and specifications of equipment to be released and other logistical and administrative requirements did not seem to be well understood.

2. Also, additional mutual aid from West Coast OSRO's did not seem to be provided as expediently as possible. Specifically, OSRO's did not seem to know the level below which they must obtain state and/or federal approval prior to releasing additional mutual aid resources, so as not to violate facility and vessel response plan requirements. It was also unclear whether the OSRO, plan holder or party requesting the mutual aid resources was responsible for requesting the necessary approvals. States, when contacted, provided quick approvals for the release.

3. As previously mentioned in this report, there were several issues concerning the USCG SONS Commandant Instruction and Pacific Area SONS policy requiring clarification. Further guidance in the context of this exercise which included a capable responsible party, multiple COTP zones with one FOSC and IMT, and opportunities for integration and co-location with the state and RP would be helpful. While maintaining flexibility for the Unified Commanders, issues to be considered include: mission definition (e.g., command and/or support), organizational structure (e.g., NIIMS ICS functions vs. issue teams), authorities (e.g., who approves IAP and General Plan), integration, facilities (e.g., co-location with RP and state), and individual roles and responsibilities.

6.2 Provide after exercise documentation of the lessons learned for each of the exercise objectives, and develop a list of recommendations to be considered in implementing changes to appropriate national, area and vessel response plans.

A. Accomplishments:

1. Lessons learned and recommendations have been provided in the joint Final Report after additional analysis and discussion of the issues contained in this Quick Report.

Objective 7 - Exercise Credit

Maximize the ability of the participants and stakeholders to receive certification and credit for participation in the training and exercise programs.

A. Accomplishments:

1. Under the State of Alaska exercise requirements and federal Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP), all industry participants will receive self-accreditation for this exercise. The state acknowledges that BP conducted a field deployment drill and tabletop training exercise in order to test the procedures in the PWS Tanker Contingency Plan. Also, in accordance with PREP guidelines, industry response teams will receive credit for an industry-led area exercise which provides for a six-year exemption from area drills. Following completion of the final Joint Evaluation Report, reciprocal exercise credit will be requested from other states as appropriate.

2. This exercise also provided an opportunity to evaluate numerous state and federal plans, including the National Contingency Plan, Alaska Unified Plan and PWS, Kodiak and Cook Inlet Subarea Plans. In addition, the USCG SONS Commandant Instruction and Pacific Area SONS guidance were exercised and evaluated. (See Appendix D for a complete list of contingency plans being exercised).

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following Recommendations are provided in response to the Accomplishments and Issues identified in the SONS Quick Report. In some cases, Accomplishments and Issues may have been added and/or revised since publication of the Quick Report.

These Recommendations are based primarily on in-depth interviews with key exercise participants and additional research into specific questions. (Refer to Appendix H for a list of those persons interviewed). Consideration was also given to the original debriefings which immediately followed the exercise, as well as written player critiques and controller/evaluator comments. All Recommendations were reviewed and approved by the Joint Evaluation Team.

In addition to the Recommendations, three additional categories of information are provided here. The first column refers to the specific Accomplishments and Issues for which that Recommendation is intended to address. The numbering correlates to the Objective/ Subobjective/Accomplishment or Issue found in Section V of this report.

The second column refers to the plan(s) and/or guidelines that were exercised and that may be affected by the Recommendations. It is understood that corrective actions which are undertaken to address these Recommendations may need to be incorporated as revisions to these documents, which will also aid in communicating these changes to plan holders and responders. The numbering in this column correlates to the List of Plans Exercised found in Appendix D.

And finally, the third column refers to the organization(s) with the responsibility for implementing appropriate actions which may come as a result of the Recommendation. Refer to Appendix A for a list of participating organizations.

Please note that the issues listed below have been presented in a prioritized format based on the significance of the recommendation.

	Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
1. As was done for this exercise, it is strongly recommended to those that would conduct a similar exercise in the future that: A. Clear and specific objectives be established, agreed to by the participants and strictly adhered to, B. Development, conduct and evaluation be accomplished jointly by the participants, and			

		Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
	C. Cooperative training be conducted prior to the exercise to enhance teamwork and maximize learning, as was done for this exercise.	2.2A1-2, 4.2A1	14	RP, USCG
2.	A joint safety risk assessment is recommended for future exercises of a significant nature, especially those involving equipment deployment, in order to maximize safety, as was done in this exercise.	1.1A.1	4	RP, ADEC, USCG
3.	Organizations should remain willing to challenge assumptions and processes, as was done in this exercise in relation to crisis management and national command. Participants should be encouraged to accept opportunities to exercise new alternatives and methods without fear of possible reproach. Note: It was suggested by several senior level participants that the next SONS exercise should be at least two days in length. In addition, it was noted that the RRT should have a designated liaison to the Design Team, as was done with the NRT in this exercise.	3.1A.1 3.2A.1 3.4A.1-4 4.1A.1-3	1,2,3,14	RP, ADEC, USCG
4.	The USCG Commandant Instruction for Spills of National Significance should be revised to address the lessons learned in this exercise. Specifically, the revised instruction should provide guidance on the following issues:	6.1B.3	1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,15, 16	USCG, States, Industry
	A. Integration of a Responsible Party (RP) into the SONS organizational structure and command/management processes. This revision also needs to consider the possibility of multiple RP's.	4.1A.1 4.1A.2 4.3B.1		
	B. Identify criteria for when a <u>single</u> Unified Command and Integrated Management Team (IMT) approach to a spill affecting multiple Captain of the Port Zones is appropriate.	2.3A.2		

	Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
Note: It was suggested by many of those interviewed that the Instruction may need to include alternative organizational structures, to address local and/or incident specific issues (e.g. multiple states), but should be consistent with section 300.140(b) of the NCP and based on NIIMS ICS principles. Appropriate span of control should also be considered when making this revision.			
C. Clear responsibilities and lines of authority between the FOSC and National Incident Commander (e.g., who approves the IAP and General Plan).	2.3B-UC1 2.5B.1 4.1B.4		
Note: It was suggested by many of those interviewed that the FOSC should be responsible for approval of both the IAP and GP, with the informed consent and possible personnel support of the NIC for the General Plan.			
D. Clear mission definition for the NIC and the SONS organization, especially as it relates to the IMT. Clarify the level at which strategic direction and approvals are given. Also, the support and oversight roles of the NIC, as it relates to the IMT should be addressed.	4.1B.2		
E. In addition, the Coast Guard may wish to consider formalizing a resource ordering process involving Integrated Support Commands and Maintenance & Logistics Commands in a manner consistent with the Expanded Dispatch and Geographic Area Coordination Center concepts of NIIMS ICS.	4.4B.1		
F. Adoption of a flexible crisis management system consistent with NIIMS ICS and industries' approach that addresses:	4.1B.1 4.3B.1		

	Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
- Organization and its basis (e.g. functional or issue driven), Note: It was suggested by most of those interviewed that one organization for USCG, state and RP would not be practical or necessary. However, publication of the Coast Guard's organization would invite understanding and pre-planning of linkages with the other response partners' organizations.			
- Individual roles and responsibilities of NIC members, and			
- Processes (i.e., concept of operations – meetings, communications with the UC/IMT, issue identification, prioritization, assignment and tracking, etc.). Note: It was also suggested by some that the CMT/NIC should have a high level strategic plan that provides both guidance and support to the General Plan, as well as identify common issues and actions for the CMT/NIC personnel. It was also noted by all interviewees that issue specific cross-organizational teams (e.g. Tiger Teams) worked very well.	4.5B.2		
G. Co-location of the CMT/NIC, or elements of the CMT/NIC, for the USCG, state and RP in one meeting space or in close vicinity to one another. Area plans should identify potential locations for the CMT/NIC. Note: Although there was some disagreement among those interviewed, it was a majority view that at least common elements of all teams should be co-located. However, the regulatory mandate for the Coast Guard and ADEC to monitor and direct the response was acknowledged. It was therefore suggested that the common space also be provided with private meeting rooms for each organization. Also, there was some concern about co-locating the CMT and NIC in the RP's offices.	4.1B.3		

	Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
H. The lines of communication between Coast Guard Headquarters, the NRT and their member agencies, RRT, and NIC should be further developed. Specifically, the role of each organizational element in relation to the others should be better defined by the NRT and CG and then incorporated into the SONS protocols. Note: It was suggested when only one state RRT is involved, the SONS protocol should allow a direct link from the NIC to the state RRT. For instance, although the existing SONS protocol establishes a direct link from the NIC to the NRT, the NRT suggested that several of the tasks forwarded for their action could have been addressed by the RRT. This situation also created some duplication of effort. In addition, the chain of command between the NRT and RRT should be established for responses. Note: For example, in the command and control environment of a SONS response, the NRT has no direct authority over the RRT. Also, the team members on the NRT have no authority over their counterparts on the RRT. RRT responsibilities during a response should be clarified and included in area plans.	4.6B.1		
I. Tasks forwarded to the NRT for action should be assigned a priority and deadline for completion. Note: It was observed that assigning an NRT liaison to the Coast Guard Headquarters Incident Management Cell improved the flow of information between the NRT and Coast Guard.	4.6B.2	1	NRT

		Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
	It is recommended that the process of revising the USCG SONS Commandant Instruction should be accomplished in consultation with and solicit input from states, industry and the response community. In addition, it is recommended that implementation of the SONS Instruction be done through the Area Contingency Plans to incorporate local issues, and to inform the regional plan holders and responders of the response structure and procedures that will be used. In addition, it is recommended that the FOG be revised to include large incident management principles. This should also be done in an open forum through workgroups and subject to public discussion.		2.3 15,16	USCG, States, Industry, Response Community USCG, ADEC, Industry
5.	The revision to the USCG SONS Commandant Instruction and state guidance should include complete definition of individual roles and responsibilities. Training should be conducted after the guidance is completed.	4.2B.1	1,2	ADEC, USCG
6.	Plan in advance, to the extent practicable, the following issues and revise/develop plans and procedures accordingly: A. Port closure and re-opening, B. Dispersants, C. Jones Act waivers, D. State and federal disaster declarations, E. Incident investigation, F. Beach set-asides, G. Human resource needs, H. Mutual aid response resources, and I. NRDA Flexibility in plans and procedures should be considered to allow the RP, SOSC and FOSC the latitude to address the unique circumstances of each event.	4.5B.1	 13 1,4,5,7 1 1,4 4 1,4,5,7 1,4 1,4	 ADEC, USCG ARRT/NRT USCG ADEC, USCG ADEC, USCG ARRT/NRT ADEC, USCG RP, States & USCG ARRT, NRT

		Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
	Note: It was recognized by key participants that many of these issues were able to be taken further than in non-SONS exercises, due to the senior level involvement of personnel from each organization.			
7.	Integration of the RP, state and USCG into the IAP development process should be formally established to better contribute/evaluate plan content and approval. This is especially true for large incidents and, therefore, large plans, when a "cold" approval by the FOSC/SOSC would be extremely difficult and time consuming. In addition, the IAP should be focused on operational guidance and support requirements, and limited in scope and size. Non-essential and background information should not be included in the IAP. Operational field units should be empowered to make tactical decisions. This integrated planning process and strategic operational / support focus for the IAP should be formally incorporated into the ICS FOG for oil spills.	2.3B-PL4	10,13, 15,16	USCG, ADEC, Industry
8.	Consider establishing a sustainable and mutually agreeable multi-year (i.e. 3-5) exercise schedule that incorporates a major exercise with equipment deployment and smaller targeted drills. In addition, evaluate the benefits of additional personnel added to exercises for training purposes versus a more realistic number of persons consistent with actual response staffing.	2.3B-PL3	10,13	RP, ADEC, USCG
9.	The UC should allocate space and time for strategic and long-term planning, separate from the common Command Post open area and independent of scheduled ICS meetings.	2.3B-UC2	10,13, 15,16	RP, ADEC, USCG

		Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
10.	The Planning Section should continually reassess the IAP to ensure that strategic and tactical direction from the Unified Command is incorporated and communicated. In addition, if planning is segregated for various geographical areas, then it is critical that the results of these separate planning efforts be combined in the overall IAP. Note: It was observed by many of those interviewed that incorporation of Western Gulf of Alaska issues was made more difficult by the Day 4 delayed start of this exercise.	2.3B.1 2.3B-PL1	10,13	RP
11.	Most of the Geographical Resource Database contains the necessary environmental sensitivity information. Prioritization of environmentally sensitive sites and tactical deployment strategies should be agreed to in the Tactics and Planning meetings, consistent with the ICS.	2.3B-OPS3	4,5,7, 15,16	RP, ADEC, USCG
12.	Revisions to the ICS Field Operations Guide (FOG) for oil spills should consider how to effectively communicate essential Incident Action Plan (IAP) information to the field and better describe the appropriate mechanism (e.g. what information is sent to the operational units in the field, and how this is to be done). During the three-year plan exercise cycle, it should also be an exercise objective to demonstrate the ability to effectively communicate essential Incident Action Plan (IAP) information to the field. Note: This recommendation is closely related to recommendation 24.	2.1B.2 2.3B-PL 4	10,13 15,16	USCG, States, Industry ADEC, RP, Alyeska
13.	The Joint Information Center model should be revised to address the following issues identified in this exercise:			USCG, States, Industry

	Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
A. How to best support the external communications role and needs of the CMT/NIC while assuring consistency, accuracy and timeliness of information at central and branch JIC's (e.g. an additional function to the existing incident JIC). Note: There was universal agreement among interviewees that there should be only one JIC with "Branch Offices." However, there was disagreement as to where the central and branch JICs should be located (i.e., NIC and IMT).	5.1B.1/5		
B. How to resolve overlap between Community Liaisons, MACS and JIC. Note: The State was concerned about the JIC acting as a conduit to the affected communities.	5.1B.1		
C. Protocols for the use of websites as communication tools, including: - Approvals for the release of information (e.g. UC), - Consistency of information for multiple sites, - Lead web page administrator's role and authority, - Web page content, - Update frequency, - Duplication of effort for multiple web pages, and - Use in exercises. Note: It was felt by most that were interviewed that web sites will be an essential communications tool in future responses. Also, it was expressed that the hardware should be sufficiently robust to handle the number of anticipated "hits".	5.1B.6		
D. Guidelines for the effective use of specialized briefings and selection, preparation and support of technical/environmental personnel involved in these briefings.	5.1B.3/4		

		Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
	E. It is recommended that the JIC guidelines be refined and used as a national protocol. The process of revising the JIC guidelines should be done in consultation with and solicit comments from states, industry and the response community. F. In addition, it is recommended that the revised JIC guidelines be made available to plan holders and responders.			
14.	Evaluate further the functionality of the statewide community broadcast capability and incorporate further testing of this complete system in future exercises.	3.4B.1	4,10	RP, ADEC
15.	Increased staffing by ADEC and the RCAC would enhance their contributions to the Joint Information Center during exercises.	5.1B.2		ADEC, RCAC
16.	Responsible parties should examine the roles, responsibilities and authorities of their Deputy Incident Commanders (DIC). Revisions to the ICS Field Operations Guide (FOG) should also consider providing further guidance on the assignment, function and responsibilities of Deputy IC's.	2.3B-UC3	10,13 15,16	RP ADEC, USCG USCG, ADEC, Industry
17.	Responsibility should be assigned and the capability established to either implement a common system or electronic links to share response information between participating organizations in a timely manner while maintaining the security of proprietary and confidential information. Note: It was suggested that a standardized communication protocol and a link over the web may be a possible option.	3.4B.3/5 4.1B.5	4,10,13	RP, ADEC, USCG (National)

		Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
18.	Revise the Area Plan to address the possibility of relocating key components of the ICS structure while addressing the need to maintain a local operational presence in heavily effected areas. The primary consideration in this decision should be safety of personnel and the most effective response. If the UC is moved to Anchorage, it will be critical to distinguish its role from that of the CMT/NIC organizations. During a multi-year plan exercise cycle, an objective should be established to evaluate the alternative long-term locations of the Command Post for a spill in southern Prince William Sound and Western Gulf of Alaska.	2.3B-UC4	4,5,6, 7,13	RP, ADEC, USCG
19.	Continue to improve the Response™ software and training on the system to address the following issues:		10,13	RP
	A. Training for persons that will use the system, especially those that request and track resources on the procurement system.	2.6B.1 3.1B.3/4 3.3B.1		
	B. Obtaining and incorporating cost data into the system.	2.6B.2 2.7B.1		
	C. A procedure to periodically update and validate resource status data.	2.3B-PL2 2.6B.3 3.1B.2		
	D. Integration of the system into the overall response and individual sections through improved processes, forms and modules. However, the overriding guideline should be simplicity in design (e.g. user friendliness) and not making the system any more complex.	2.6B.4 3.1B.1		
20.	Continue to improve the Response™ hardware to enhance its redundancies and back up systems to avoid the accidental loss of operational capability and/or data.	2.7B.1 3.1B.5	10	RP

		Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
21.	Training should be conducted for all responders expected to use technology tools, including basic communications equipment.	2.2B.1 3.4B.2/4 4.2 B.2		RP, ADEC, USCG
22.	Continue to improve and further refine the Logistics Support Modules. Resource typing should be incorporated further into the ICS FOG manual. In addition, similar modules should be considered to maximize the efficiency of government resources. Note: It was a consensus of those interviewed that standardization of resources, such as this, was of overwhelming value. This is especially true for those mutual aid and out-of-region personnel that are integrated into the spill management team.	3.2B.1	10, 15, 16	RP,USCG, ADEC, Industry
23.	During the three-year plan exercise cycle, consider exercising further the Logistics purchasing function to source a representative sample of resources to support the Logistics Support Modules.	2.5B.2	10,13	RP, ADEC, USCG
24.	The ICS Division Assignment form (ICS-204) should be used for all field deployments in its entirety. Information contained on this form should include, among other things, the tactical objectives for this division, operation boundaries and appropriate procedures to be followed. The use of the ICS form 204 and its contents should be reviewed in the FOG update.	2.1B.1 2.3B-OPS4	10,13 15,16	RP, Alyeska USCG, ADEC, Industry
25.	The situation status and resource status information displays should be updated frequently and when critical information changes, consistent with the ICS.	2.3B-OPS1 2.3B-PL2 3.3B.1	10,13, 15,16	RP, USCG, ADEC

	Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
26. All management and supervisory ICS positions (e.g., IC's, DIC's and Section Chiefs) should appoint an alternate to assume their duties when they are unavailable, such as while attending meetings. In addition, these same persons should provide periodic status updates and briefings to their subordinates following meeting(s) to improve the flow of critical information.	2.3B-UC5	10,13	RP, ADEC, USCG
27. Formalize agreements between Alaska co-ops to address mutual aid issues, such as: A. Request/approval procedures, B. Criteria/approval for the release of resources, C. Exchange of inventories and equipment specifications, and D. Other logistical and administrative requirements. Note: There was a belief by the majority of those interviewed that some procedures currently exist and that resources would in fact be shared in an actual event. However, there was also universal agreement that additional procedures are needed and that existing procedures need to be revised to thoroughly address the issues listed above. Finally, all procedures need to be communicated to plan holders and responders.	6.1B.1	4,13	RP, ADEC, Co-ops, USCG
28. Formalize agreements and/or procedures to address issues similar to those listed above for mutual aid with West Coast co-ops. Review of these procedures/agreements for mutual aid should also consider requirements for the availability of resources to meet planning criteria in applicable Federal and State vessel and facility response plan regulations.	6.1B.2	1	RP, States/BC Task Force, USCG

		Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
29.	Fishing Vessel training should be able to be provided at multiple locations while at the same time assuring consistency between training sites. PWS Community College should be encouraged to further enhance this capability.	1.2B.1	13	RP, Alyeska
30.	The hydraulic system on Barge 500-2 should be modified to provide sufficient capacity to operate multiple on-board systems, as well as provide redundancy. Funds have been allocated for this project. Engineering is complete and fabrication is underway. Completion is scheduled for 1st Quarter 1999.	1.1B.4	13	Alyeska
31.	During a three-year plan exercise cycle, the skimming systems to be exercised should include a representative sample appropriate for weathered oil and winter conditions.	1.1B.1	10,12,13	RP, ADEC
32.	A system should be established to update the Fishing Vessel database periodically (e.g., semi-annually) to further improve the quality of this constantly changing resource. SERVS is currently working with Fishing Vessel Administrators to put this update process in place.	1.3B.1	13	Alyeska
33.	Elements of the Fishing Vessel Safety Plan, including use of the buddy system, should be included and/or emphasized in the Fishing Vessel training.	1.1B.2	13	RP
34.	Equipment necessary for effective decanting, including water paste, measuring devices and scupper plugs, was available but not used during the exercise. Formal procedures for decanting of response barges are being developed jointly by Alyeska and ADEC. These should be completed and implemented.	1.1B.3	13	Alyeska, ADEC

		Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
35.	Training should be provided on the Fishing Vessel activation process to F/V Administrators and stakeholders. In addition, notification of a representative sample of Tier III Fishing Vessels should be incorporated in future exercises.	1.3B.2 1.3B.3	13	Alyeska
36.	To facilitate effective use of a Coast Guard high endurance cutter as a field command platform, two local MSO personnel should be provided, one on the bridge and one in the Combat Information Center (CIC). Similarly, four would be required for 24-hour operations.	1.4B.1		USCG
37.	Request airborne surveillance radar support from DOD in similar circumstances of high surrounding terrain and no FAA-provided air traffic control in the locale.	1.4B.5		USCG
38.	Consider providing transponders to key USCG and industry response vessels for asset tracking via Vessel Tracking Center (VTC) to further enhance safety and resource management.	1.4B.2		RP, USCG
39.	As a temporary measure, initially assign response vessels to CG standard working frequencies until reprogramming of other VHF-FM radios on board the CG cutter may be accomplished.	1.4B.3		USCG
40.	Task District Response Advisory Teams or District Industrial Hygienists to provide oil spill decontamination training and to develop appropriate personal protective equipment stocking lists for various cutter types.	1.4B.4		USCG

		Issue	Plan	Lead Org.
41.	Drill participants found existing resources in Cordova, including the airport and dock area, to be adequate in carrying out exercise objectives. However, in using the PWS Subarea Contingency Plan (Section B, Part One, "Resources", on page B-17), participants found additional resources that were utilized during the drill. It is recommended that the PWS Subarea committee update this section of the plan to include the examples listed in the Note below and other amenities available in Cordova. Note: Examples of this include: A. An area off the main airport runway proved to be very successful as an initial lay down area during the SONS drill. This are was arranged through local contact with airport officials. This space is not listed in the Sub Area Plan. B. During the SONS drill, participants had to change plans several times due to weather conditions. The use of a local contractor, not listed in the Sub Area Plan, proved to be successful. The contractor had the heavy equipment that was needed to move out-of-region equipment from the airport to the city dock and then load it out on to the vessel(s). C. Several meetings were required to keep the fishing vessel fleet informed. The CDFU union hall proved to be a good meeting place. In a real event, the hall would be filled with local fishing vessel captains waiting for their assignments. A list of local buildings to set up a command post would be helpful.	1.1A.3 1.1A.5	5	ADEC
42.	When the Coast Guard executes the e-mail and data exchange system again, they should hire their own vendors.	3.4		USCG

VII. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the exercise and participating organizations met all of the Objectives established by the Design Team. This Quick Report identifies accomplishments and issues which resulted from the exercise. In-depth interviews will be conducted with key participants to analyze and discuss these accomplishments and issues. A final Joint Evaluation Report will be issued by the Evaluation Team no later than January 24, 1999 to update accomplishments and issues, and to provide recommendations for further action.

Regarding the exercise itself, comments were solicited from all participants. On a scale of 1-5, (5 being best), the players rated the exercise a 3.7 for providing a realistic opportunity to evaluate the designated objectives. A summary of the participant critique ratings is contained in Appendix G. Individual comments by players, controllers and evaluators about the exercise can be summarized as follows:

- The exercise was well planned and provided an excellent opportunity to learn and test our skills.

- Although difficult to accomplish, the exercise beginning on Day 4 provided a unique opportunity to extend the response processes to the next phase (which had never been reached in a drill before).

- The objectives driven approach for each phase of the exercise kept it on target.

- The evaluation process was comprehensive and well thought out.

- The exercise should have been a full two days in length in order to completely address some of the issues raised and better utilize the huge investment in time and resources.

- Despite all of the advance planning, training and interpersonal interactions between the individual teams, most players felt like it was Day 1, not 4. Teams are comprised of people that still need to get acquainted and mentally adjust, before getting up to speed.

- Greater utilization and understanding of exercise Truth by the players would have provided a more realistic view of field operations.

- Last minute changes to the scenario and Day 4 Incident Action Plan resulted in some confusion and inconsistency between these documents and among the players and controllers.

- The remote location of Control/Truth from the play space was overcome. However, it was felt that future exercises could be improved by co-locating these organizations.

- More extensive inputs of scripted Issues (Appendix C) for the National Incident Command and Crisis Management Team would have provided a greater challenge.

- A significant increase in the projected staffing of the Joint Information Center resulted in fewer role players and controllers than would have been desired.

On behalf of BP, the exercise Design and Control Teams and the commanders from Alaska Department of Conservation and the United States Coast Guard, our sincere appreciation is expressed to all those individuals that contributed considerable time and effort to this successful training exercise.

SONS EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

BP America
BP Oil Shipping (BP or Responsible Party – RP)
BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc.
USCG – HQ, Washington D.C.
USCG – National Strike Force Coordination Center, Elizabeth City
USCG – Pacific Area, Alameda
USCG – District 17, Juneau
USCG – MSO Anchorage
USCG – MSO Valdez
USCG Pacific Strike Team
National Pollution Funds Center
Alaska Regional Response Team
National Response Team
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (Hazmat, NRDA)
U.S. Navy – Supervisor of Salvage
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
Regional Citizen Advisory Councils
Alyeska/SERVS
Alaska Clean Seas
Marine Spill Response Corporation
Oil Spill Response Limited, Southampton, England
ARCO Mutual Aid
Maritime Overseas Corporation

1998 Alaska SONS Exercise

Objectives/Expectations

1.1 Demonstrate the ability to locate, transport and deploy out of region resources within the 72-hour planning guideline for initial task forces, by actually transporting and deploying the following representative sample of this equipment.

- *Transport an adequate amount of out-of-region equipment to Alaska to fully deploy one near shore task force. Ensure equipment is compatible with existing Prince William Sound (PWS) equipment and operational procedures.*

  Expectation: Acquire 6 suitable skimmers and 12 suitable towable storage devices. The measure of suitability for the skimmers will be that they can be deployed and operated from the available fishing vessels and they are effective for the expected condition of the oil at the time of the intended use in the operating area (i.e. Heavily weathered crude). The storage devices must have a recyclable and a viable operational plan in place to allow the skimmers to operate 12 hours per day.

- *Deploy one task force in areas impacted after day four. At a minimum, four fishing vessels are to be from the Tier 3 group.*

  Expectation: Task force must consist, at a minimum of 3 strike teams with a total of 26-34 vessels. Deployment location must demonstrate that oil could be intercepted before leaving the Sound. Four vessels must be assigned response activities that demonstrate their ability perform all near shore recovery operations (barge towing, boom towing, skimming operation).

1.2 Conduct training for the fishing vessel fleet on the strategies and techniques for forming initial near shore task forces.

Expectation: Fishing Vessel personnel will be able to demonstrate proper strategies and techniques for deployment of near shore task forces.

1.3 Demonstrate the ability to use Tier 3 fishing vessels for deployment of initial out-of-region task forces by identifying, inspecting and training a representative group.

Expectation: A representative group of Tier 3 Fishing Vessels will be selected, trained and inspected for deployment of out-of-region resources.

1.4 Demonstrate the ability to locate, transport and deploy federal response resources and personnel in an integrated manner, by actually deploying the following equipment.

Expectation:

- *One USCG VOSS deployed from a USCG WLB within 72 hours (Cordova).*
- *One USN SUPSALV VOSS deployed from a USCG WLB within 72 hours (Seward).*
- *One Alyeska ADDS deployed from a USCG C130 and apply dispersant (simulated) within 20 feet of a target datum with coverage of at least one square mile within 24 hours (PWS, Anchorage and Knight Island).*
- *One USCG WHEC as a C3 platform for the on-water recovery group within 72 hours.*
- *One USCG WPB for vessel traffic control and response group search and rescue in the on-water area.*

2.1 Develop a 72-hour Incident Action Plan for day 4 and effectively transfer response management from Alyeska to BP.

Expectation: Prior to the drill, the Incident Management Team, along with Alyeska, SERVS, will:

- *Develop a comprehensive IAP for Day 4 which is approved by the Unified Command.*
- *The IAP will address strategic objectives, environmental priorities and safety.*
- *Operational tactics and field deployment of resources will be consistent with strategic objectives and environmental priorities.*
- *The IAP will address all logistical requirements.*

2.2 Develop and conduct training for BP's Incident Management Team (IMT) and integrated local, state and federal personnel on activation, deployment, and sustaining out-of-region resources.

Expectation:

- *The IMT will act as an integrated team of BP, federal and state personnel.*
- *The integrated IMT will implement their training and demonstrate their ability to effectively activate, deploy and sustain out-of-region resources.*

2.3 Demonstrate the ability of the Unified Command to effectively manage an incident that involves more than one Captain of the Port (COTP) zone.

Expectation:

- *A Unified Command will be formed.*
- *Produce and approve an Incident Action Plan (IAP) that addresses the impacted and threatened regions in Valdez and Anchorage COTP zones for Day 5.*
- *Actions for each zone are coordinated and do not conflict.*

- *Establish appropriate information flow between the Crisis Management Team (CMT)/National Incident Command (NIC) and the Unified Command (UC).*

2.4 Demonstrate the ability to integrate state, federal and industry personnel and optimize their utilization.

Expectation:
- *Develop and implement an organization chart.*
- *Establish clear roles and responsibilities, avoiding redundancies.*
- *Roles are in conformance with applicable plans and ICS.*

2.5 Demonstrate the ability to conduct long range strategic planning by the preparation of an ICS General Plan.

Expectation:
- *The general plan is comprehensive and realistic.*
- *The general plan identifies long-term logistical and support needs.*
- *Objectives, priorities and activities are agreed to by UC.*

2.6 Demonstrate the ability to effectively manage logistical requirements for a sustained response with out-of-region resources and integration of federal/state procurement and resources.

Expectation:
- *Develop a long-term logistics forecast for the response.*
- *Provide the source and ETA for all critical resources, including messing, berthing, transportation, fuel, storage and disposal of all wastes, and sanitation.*
- *Address the procurement requirements for each participating organization, including accounting data and location and authority of contracting officers.*

2.7 Demonstrate the ability to capture, compile, project and report cost documentation.

Expectation:
- *Estimate costs through Day 5 for all deployed resources, including commercial and government.*
- *Develop a complete cost estimate through to the end of the approved general plan.*
- *Develop a claims strategy and plan addressing number of locations, expected number of claims, claims handling procedures and payment processing.*

3.1 Demonstrate the effectiveness of RESPONSE software to support logistical management of response resources.

Expectation:

- *Depict the entire response organization from UC down to group, task force, and strike team levels.*
- *Manage all infrastructure and resource information to support field assignments, including communications, facilities, warehousing, security, messing, berthing, fueling and sanitation.*

- *Produce accurate and comprehensive Division/Group and Task Force/Strike Team Assignment forms (ICS-204's, and 204-1's) for all defined field assignments which are consistent with the IAP.*
- *Portrays and agrees with the rest of the IAP.*

3.2 Validate the Logistics Support Modules for identifying support resources needed for deployment of additional out-of-region resource task forces and integrated federal resources.

Expectation:

- *Identify a complete and comprehensive list of cross-functional elements to support field deployments, including food, berthing, fuel, sanitation, facilities, and equipment.*
- *Simplify and speed the ordering process for support resources.*

3.3 Demonstrate the ability to implement a resource tracking system for resources deployed to the field.

Expectation:

- *Develop a plan and/or flow chart for tracking all resources.*
- *Make available in real time information on the status of any resource.*

3.4 Demonstrate the ability to develop an information technology (IT) strategy to support UC and IMT system and information requirements for effective response management and communications, including external audiences.

Expectation:

- *Provide appropriate UC/CMT/NIC information sharing capabilities via electronic network, phone, fax, etc.*
- *Shared information should be accurate, complete and timely.*
- *Provide a functional website for access by the public to response information.*

4.1 Demonstrate the ability of the Crisis Management Team (CMT) and National Incident Command (NIC) to direct and lead a SONS incident that involves more than one COTP zone.

Expectation:

- *CMT/NIC takes a leadership role by providing strategic direction to the UC and effectively overseeing the UC's efforts, including the resolution of conflicts between zones.*
- *The federal, state, and industry area commanders are seen as cooperating.*

- *CMT/NIC identifies early and proactively manages national issues.*
- *The UC is effectively supported with assistance provided by the CMT/NIC.*
- *Public in effected and threatened communities are satisfied that the response is aware of and is addressing their needs.*

4.3 Demonstrate the ability to effectively integrate the NIC with BP's CMT.

Expectation:

- *An organization chart is developed and implemented.*
- *BP, state and federal personnel understand each other's roles, abilities and resources.*
- *Issues are discussed and resolved in a unified fashion, when appropriate.*
- *Critical information is coordinated and shared.*

4.4 Demonstrate the ability of the CMT/NIC to provide assistance and support to the UC, including logistics for out-of-region resources.

Expectation:

- *Requests from the UC will be screened for appropriateness and either accepted by the CMT/NIC or returned to the UC with necessary guidance.*
- *Assistance requested by the UC is acted upon in a timely manner providing satisfactory results.*
- *A system is utilized to record and track assistance requests from the UC, and provide feedback on the status of these requests to the UC at appropriate periodic intervals.*

4.5 Demonstrate the ability of the CMT/NIC to address national external issues other than those normally associated with Unified Command or the Joint Information Center (JIC).

Expectation:

- *Issues will be screened, prioritized, assigned and tracked for status and completion.*
- *Issues will be addressed in a timely manner, consistent with priorities, with satisfactory results.*
- *CMT/NIC staff will be utilized effectively, including subject matter experts, with an appropriate amount of guidance from the CMT/NIC. This staff will be easily accessed by the IMT.*
- *State, federal and responsible party personnel will closely coordinate their actions and keep the other parties informed.*

4.6 Demonstrate the ability of the Alaska Regional Response Team (ARRT) and National Response Team (NRT) to support and provide assistance to the CMT/NIC.

Expectation:

- *Both the ARRT and NRT will screen, prioritize and track the status of assistance requests from the CMT/NIC and UC.*
- *Assistance requests will be effectively communicated to appropriate agencies when necessary.*
- *Feedback will be provided to the UC/CMT/NIC at appropriate intervals.*

- *Assistance requests will be addressed in a timely manner in a way that facilitates response activities.*

- *Information will flow through the ARRT and NRT to appropriate agencies and departments.*

5.1 Demonstrate the ability to develop a system to allow the public and stakeholders to keep abreast of spill related issues and development.

Expectation:

- *Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) which is consistent with response contingency plans and integrate state, federal and responsible party resources.*
- *Effectively address the public's questions and concerns in a timely manner, including remote locations.*
- *Proactively provide the best source of timely and accurate information about all response related matters, both internally and externally.*
- *Effectively disseminate information through joint press releases, press conferences, townhall meetings, phone banks and other appropriate means.*
- *The JIC will support the public and media needs of the UC and CMT/NIC.*
- *Messages from CMT/NIC and UC will be consistent.*
- *All information will be approved by the UC prior to external dissemination.*
- *Utilize an Internet web page to disseminate information.*

5.2 Demonstrate the ability to deploy video-teleconferencing capability to designated communities in order to provide incident updates and gather stakeholder concerns.

Expectation:

- *Utilize video teleconferencing to provide communities with simultaneous up to date response information.*
- *Stakeholders will have an opportunity to express their concerns and have their questions answered by the UC.*
- *Teleconferencing will be of sufficient quality to meet all other expectations.*
- *Video conferencing will add value to the response external communications effort and present a professional and competent image.*
- *Video conferencing will incorporate Community Liaison functions.*

6.1 Conduct a thorough exercise evaluation process to assess the effectiveness of various command levels and response teams to implement the applicable response and contingency plans.

Expectation:

- *The evaluation will be based on exercise objectives, expectations and significant issues, and linked to respective plans.*

- *The evaluation will be conducted by a cross-organization team of recognized experts.*
- *The evaluation will include the equipment deployments in South Central Alaska and the tabletop exercise in Valdez and Anchorage.*

6.2 Provide after exercise documentation of the lessons learned for each of the exercise objectives, and develop a list of recommendations to be considered in implementing changes to appropriate national, area and vessel response plans.

Expectation:

- *The evaluation will incorporate input from players, controllers, evaluators and in-depth follow-up interviews with key participants.*
- *The evaluation will provide insightful and meaningful feedback on the performance of personnel and equipment resources to encourage further improvement in response capabilities.*
- *Identified inconsistencies between response plans will be reported.*

APPENDIX C

MASTER LIST OF ISSUES INJECTS
(Ordered by Objectives)

Obj.	Issue	Org.	Section	
2.1	Handoff from Alyeska	UC	UC	P
2.3	Control of air space beyond initial response (e.g. FAA on USCG cutter)	UC	Log	S
2.3 4.6	Flow of information between NRT, RRT, IAC and UC	UC AIC	N/A	P
2.3 2.5	Challenge operational strategies (don't just pick at resources - e.g., skimmer breaks down).	UC	Ops	P
2.3 5.1	Public health at impacted communities	UC JIC	Liaison	P
2.3	Protection/replacement of subsistence fisheries	UC	Plan	S
2.3	Vessel salvage plan development and approval	UC	Ops	S
2.3	Criteria for closing and re-opening fisheries	UC	Plan	P
2.3	Integration of RP and trustees in NRDA process	UC	NRDA	S
2.3	Date to suspend response operations for the winter (consider safety of personnel)	UC	Ops	S
2.3	Ability to decide the issue of scientific study set-aside areas	UC	Plan	S
2.3	Location of UC emergency operations center (Valdez vs. Anchorage)	UC	UC	S
2.3	Native representation concerns (cleanup priorities; native lands)	UC	Liaison	P
2.3 4.1	Resource prioritization and allocation	UC	Ops	P
2.3 4.1	Environmental protection prioritization (incl. addressing external influences on issues)	UC	Plan	P
2.3 4.1	Span of organizational control based on magnitude of spill	UC	UC	P
2.4	USCG inspection of Tier III fishing vessels	UC	OPS	S
2.4 4.3	Integration of agency personnel into RP's ICS and CMT organizations (incl. multiple MSOs)	UC NIC	UC IAC	P
2.6	Adequate berthing, messing and sanitation in remote areas (possible use of DOD, state vessels)	UC	Log	P
2.6 4.4	Strategy for resourcing long-range personnel needs (incl. workers, supv's, & gov't.)	NIC	Log	P
2.6	Native resources are available to assist in cleanup	UC	Log	S
2.6	Availability of additional resources (e.g. secondary storage, Tier III F/Vs))	UC	Log	P
2.7	What process will Finance use to audit field resources?	UC	Fin	S
2.7	Adequacy of handling claims	UC	Fin	P
2.7	Can Finance pay in cash daily? (e.g. process)	UC	Fin	S
2.7 5.1	Parity of local pay vs. spill labor	UC JIC	Fin	S
2.7	Ability to capture, report and project all costs, including agency resources	UC	Fin	P
2.7 5.1	On water berthing - loss of local revenue by hotels	UC	Liaison	S
3.2 3.3	Integration, tracking, and logistical support of gov't resources by the IMT	UC	Log	P
3.4	Remote sensing and satellite imagery (govt and comm'l)	UC	Plan	S
3.4	Adequacy of comms (systems and info) between Anchorage and Valdez	UC NIC	Log	P
4.1	System to periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the response	NIC	N/A	P
4.4	Access to large support aircraft from lower 48 for commercial equipment (C-5s)	NIC	N/A	S
4.4	Process for release of West Coast resources via BC/States Task Force (depletion of response resources in lower 48; possible state refusal)	NIC	N/A	S
4.4	Immigration and customs	NIC	N/A	S

Obj.	Issue	Org.	Section	
4.6				
4.5	Interruption of trade and mitigation.	NIC	N/A	P
4.5	Jones Act relief to access Canadian resources	NIC	N/A	S
4.5	Visits by dignitaries (Secretary of DOT, U.S. VP)	NIC	N/A	S
4.5	Responder immunity for ARCO and other mutual aid personnel	NIC	N/A	P
4.5	Criteria for re-opening terminal and shipping lanes	NIC	N/A	P
4.5	Legal opinion regarding multiple MSO's/FOSC's vs. IAC concept	NIC	N/A	P
4.5	National security implications of TAPS reductions	NIC	N/A	P
4.5	State and federal revenue implications	NIC	N/A	S
4.5	Need for federal or state disaster declaration	NIC	N/A	S
4.6	Access by RRT to federal agency resources within the region in support of response organization	RRT UC	N/A	S
4.6	NRT support to RRT in accessing out of region resources	NRT NIC	N/A	P
4.6	Process to screen vendor proposals	NIC	N/A	S
5.0	Adequacy of JIC model	JIC	N/A	P
5.1	Consistency of information between IAC, UC and points of dissemination	JIC NIC	N/A	P
5.1	Lack of Unified Command credibility with public (overcome Exxon Valdez)	JIC	N/A	P

Primary = P
Secondary = S

LISTING OF SPILL CONTINGENCY PLANS/GUIDELINES EXERCISED

	RESPONSE PLAN	AUTHORIZING REGULATION	ELEMENTS BEING EXERCISED
1.	US National Contingency Plan	Revised by The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, amendment to the Clean Water Act	300.323- Spills of National Significance
2.	COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION 16465.1, Spills of National Significance (SONS).		
3.	Appendix 25 to Annex C to USCG COMMANDER, PACIFIC AREA OPLAN 9800-98, Spill of National Significance Response Operation		
4.	The Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil & Hazardous Substance Discharges/ Releases (Unified Plan-Vol 1)	OPA-90 COMDTINST 16465.47 10/8/93 AS 46.04.200-210	Annex B- Unified Response Organization Appendix VII-SONS & Area Command Authority (ACA) Annex C- Operational Administration Annex E- Summary of Area Resources Annex F- Chemical Countermeasures Annex G – Wildlife Protection Guidelines Annex H- Health, Safety and Training Annex I- Public Affairs Annex K – Applicable Memoranda of Understanding/Agreement
5.	Prince William Sound SubArea Contingency Plan	Revised by The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, amendment to the Clean Water Act AS 46.04.210	Section A – Response Section B - Resources Section D – Sensitive Areas
6.	Cook Inlet SubArea Contingency Plan	Revised by The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, amendment to the Clean Water Act AS 46.04.210	Section A – Response Section B - Resources Section D – Sensitive Areas
7.	Kodiak SubArea Contingency Plan	Revised by The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, amendment to the Clean Water Act AS 46.04.210	Section A – Response Section B - Resources Section D – Sensitive Areas
8.	Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plans (ODPCP's)	AS 46.04.030	
9.	Local Emergency Response Plans	US Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Title III (SARA Title III) AS 26.23.071 - .075 addresses the State Emergency Response Commission and Local Emergency Planning Committees to include local emergency response planning	
10.	BP Oil Shipping OPA-90 Vessel Response Plan, Vol I Emergency Procedures for oil & Hazardous Spills and Vessel Casualty Incidents	Revised by The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, amendment to the Clean Water Act	Section III- Response Management
11.	BP Oil Shipping OPA-90 Vessel Response Plan, Vol II Qualified Individual Handbook	Revised by The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, amendment to the Clean Water Act	Section 6- Maritime Overseas Corporations
12.	Owner Vessel Response Plan (Maritime Overseas Corp.)	Revised by The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, amendment to the Clean Water Act MARPOL Reg. 26 US FWPCA	Sec III- Shipboard Procedures Sec IV- Shore-based Response Activities Sec IX- Geographic Specific Appendixes COTP Prince William Sound Annex IV- PWS Emergency Towing Package

	RESPONSE PLAN	AUTHORIZING REGULATION	ELEMENTS BEING EXERCISED
13.	Prince William Sound Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan (Core Plan)	AS 46.04.030	Part 1- Response Action Plan Part 2-Prevention Part 3- Supplemental Information Documents Sid #1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9, 10,11,12,13,14,15,16, 17,18,19,20,21,
14.	National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines		Area Exercise – 15 Elements
15.	Oil Spill Field Operations Guide (ICS-OS-420-1) June, 1996		All Parts
16.	ADEC Oil & Hazardous Substance Response Field Operations Guide, June, 1998		All Parts

APPENDIX E

BP 1998 Alaska SONS Exercise Schedule

Phase 3 ***Field Deployments and Tabletop Exercise***

Monday, September 21st

Time	Valdez	Anchorage	On-Water	Communities
All day			Evaluators observe equipment deployment in Western Prince William Sound and Seward	
All day		Transport Tabletop participants to Valdez (see flight schedule attached)		
1 pm	Briefing of controllers/evaluators in actual play spaces, and setup of Control and Truth	Briefing of controllers/evaluators		
TBD	Overflight of deployment by Unified Command	Overflight of deployment by NIC/ CMT		
6 pm	Tabletop participants player briefings CIVIC CENTER- Theater	Tabletop participants player briefings BPXA- 1st Floor		
7:30 pm	Unified Command Press Briefing- CIVIC CENTER- Theater			

BP 1998 Alaska SONS Exercise Schedule

Tuesday, September 22nd

Time	Valdez	Anchorage	On-Water	Communities
5:00 am - 6:00 am	Breakfast (buses/vans will transport participants from hotels to facilities (schedule TBD)			
6:00 am	Exercise begins - Controller briefing CIVIC CENTER	Exercise begins - Controller briefing		
6:15 am	Planning Section brief	Listen to IMT Briefing		
6:30 am - 9:30 am		JIC Phone Bank operating		
9:00 am -3:00pm		NRDA Workshop (Contact Ray Jakubczak (907-564-4664)		
9:00 - 9:30 am		Video Teleconference at USCG Commandant/BP Senior Management & Alaska Delegates in Washington, D.C.		
9:30 -10:00 am		Video Teleconference @ USCG National Response Teams		
11:30 am		Follow-up VTC NIC/NRT		
12:00 pm	Lunch Break	Lunch Break		
1:00 pm	Timeout - Control Update	Timeout - Control Update		
1:15 pm	Resume play	Resume play		
2:00 pm	Community briefing preparation CIVIC CENTER- Theater			Community briefing preparation to Community leaders by liaison personnel
3:00 pm	Interactive community briefings			Interactive community briefings (Chenega, Cordova, Kodiak, Valdez)
4:00 pm	Community debrief			Community debrief by liaisons (Chenega, Cordova, Kodiak, and Valdez)
Exercise Ending	Controller meeting	Controller meeting		
Exercise Ending	Reception for participants and community leaders (Civic Ctr)			

BP 1998 Alaska SONS Exercise Schedule

Wednesday, September 23rd

Time	Valdez	Anchorage	On-Water	Communities
7:00 am	Continental Breakfast (buses/vans will transport participants from hotels to facilities (schedule TBD)	Continental Breakfast		
8:00 am	Controller brief to UC	Controller brief to NIC/CMT		
8:15 am	IAP and General Plan briefing	IAP and General Plan briefing		
9:00 am-10:00am	Breakout by response sections to assess objective accomplishments and lessons learned	Review of IAP and General plan adequacy to accomplish exercise objectives		
10:00 am	Reporting of section summaries	Press briefing attendees start preparation for press conference in BPXA- Rm C Remaining participants conduct debriefing of objective accomplishments, lessons learned and development of SONS priority issues to discuss		
	Controller/evaluator debriefing	Controller/evaluator debriefing		
11:00 am	Breakdown/cleanup	NIC/ CMT Press Conference		
11:30 am - 3:10 pm	Unified Command departs to Anchorage for 1:00 meeting. IMT departs Valdez for Anchorage (see schedule for flight information) (Box lunches provided for flight)	Arrival of Valdez participants. Buses transporting to BP building for reception.		
12:00 pm		Lunch in BP Cafeteria		
1:00 pm		SONS Workshop for UC, CMT and NIC leaders		
		Breakdown/cleanup		
4:00 pm – 6:30 pm		Reception for exercise participants and guests BPXA - Cafeteria		

BP 1998 ALASKA SONS DRILL

"Out of Region Response Resources Deployment and Training"

FIELD ACTIVITIES SCHEDULE "Chenega Division"

DATE	TIME	ACTIVITY
9-18-98	0800	BP will conduct call-out of "Out of Region" Nearshore Equipment
9-18-98	0900	SERVS Crew to arrive onboard Response Barge 500-2
9-18-98	0930	Caterer to arrive on 500-2
9-18-98	0930	Guard/Medic to arrive on 500-2
9-18-98	1000	Valdez Fishing Vessel Skiffs to be loaded onboard 500-2
9-18-98	1030	NOAA Meteorological Rep. To arrive in Cordova
9-18-98	1100	500-2 Deck all secure and ready for sea
9-18-98	1200	500-2 Underway for Cordova
9-19-98	0500-0600	Breakfast
9-19-98	0600	Commence day shift, 500-2 Arrive in Cordova, moor at Ocean Dock
9-19-98	0800	NOAA Meteorological Reps to arrive on 500-2, conduct weather briefing
9-19-98	0830	Morning Safety Meeting "All Hands" 500-2 Deck
9-19-98	0900	Meeting the MSRC Reps in Cordova to discuss Equipment load out
9-19-98	0930	Commence MSRC Equipment Load out/Familiarization with FV Crews
9-19-98	1200-1300	Lunch
9-19-98	1300	Resume Equipment Load out/Familiarization
9-19-98	1400	Meeting with USCGC SWEETBRIER, ADEC, BP to discuss schedule of events
9-19-98	1800	Secure from day shift
9-19-98	1800-1900	Evening Meal, secure from day shift
9-19-98	2200	NOAA Meteorological Reps conduct weather briefing
9-20-98	0500-0600	Breakfast
9-20-98	0600	Commence day shift
9-20-98	0800	Valdez Fishing Vessels and (1) Mini Barge depart Valdez enroute exercise site
9-20-98	1000	NOAA Meteorological Reps conduct weather briefing with APSC, USCG, ADEC, BP. Exercise location decision completed.
9-20-98	1030	Notify Valdez Fishing Vessel Fleet of exercise location
9-20-98	1200	Task Force 6 underway enroute exercise location

BP 1998 ALASKA SONS DRILL

"Out of Region Response Resources Deployment and Training"

FIELD ACTIVITIES SCHEDULE "Chenega Division"

DATE	TIME	ACTIVITY
9-20-98	1200	Krystal Sea departs Valdez enroute exercise location with remaining personnel
9-20-98	1200-1300	Lunch
9-20-98	1800-1900	Evening Meal
9-20-98	1800	Valdez Fishing Vessel Fleet arrives exercise location
9-20-98	1930	Krystal Sea arrives at exercise location
9-20-98	2000	Task Force 6 arrives at exercise location
9-20-98	2200	Safety/Weather briefing
9-21-98	0500-0600	Breakfast
9-21-98	0630-0700	Morning Safety Meeting/Operations Meeting "All Hands" 500-2 Deck
9-21-98	0700	Begin deployment to TF6/ST1
9-21-98	0800	Complete deployment to TF6/ST1, Commence deployment to TF6/ST2
9-21-98	0900	TF6/ST1 in "U" Module formation, hold for (1 hour) then change to "J" Module
9-21-98	1000	Complete deployment to TF6/ST2
9-21-98	1030	TF6/ST2 in "U" Module formation, hold till over flight of observer aircraft
9-21-98	1030	USCG C-130 on deck standing by and loaded with ADDS Anchorage Air Port
9-21-98	1100	TF6/ST3 in VOSS formation, hold till over flight of observer aircraft
9-21-98	1130	USCG C-130 wheels up from Anchorage Air Port ETA to Chenega 1215
9-21-98	1145	Observer aircraft wheels up from Anchorage Air Port ETA 1225
9-21-98	1200	TF6/ST1 in "J" Module formation, hold till over flight of observer aircraft
9-21-98	1200-1300	Lunch
9-21-98	1230	USCG C-130 onscene and commencing ADDS Demonstration
9-21-98	1230	Observer aircraft onscene observing TF6 and ADDS demonstration
9-21-98	1300	USCG C-130 and Observer Aircraft depart Chenega Op Area
9-21-98	1300	TF6/ST1 change to Cascade Module
9-21-98	1300	TF6/ST2 change to Cascade Module
9-21-98	1300	Begin demobilization of excess TF6/ST1 & 2 response equipment
9-21-98	1400	TF6/ST1 in Cascade formation, hold for (1 hour)

BP 1998 ALASKA SONS DRILL

"Out of Region Response Resources Deployment and Training"

FIELD ACTIVITIES SCHEDULE "Chenega Division"

DATE	TIME	ACTIVITY
9-21-98	1400	TF6/ST2 in Cascade formation, hold for (1 hour)
9-21-98	1430	TF6/ST3 begin demobilization
9-21-98	1500	TF6/ST1 & 2 begin demobilization
9-21-98	1700	Demobilization complete
9-21-98	1730	Charter aircraft arrives to pick up Drill Participants
9-21-98	1800-1900	Evening meal, secure from day shift
9-21-98	2000-2100	Exercise Safety debrief and critique
9-21-98	2100	Fishing Vessels released from drill, 500-2 & Krystal Sea enroute Cordova
9-22-98	0500	500-2 & Krystal Sea arrive Cordova to offload MSRC equipment
9-22-98	0500-0600	Breakfast, commence day shift
9-22-98	0630-0700	Morning Safety Meeting/Operations Meeting "All Hands" 500-2Deck
9-22-98	0730	Commence offload of MSRC Equipment
9-22-98	1000	500-2 & Krystal Sea underway enroute Valdez
9-22-98	1800	500-2 & Krystal Sea arrive Valdez

BP 1998 ALASKA SONS DRILL

"Out of Region Response Resources Deployment and Training"

FIELD ACTIVITIES SCHEDULE "Seward Division"

DATE	TIME	ACTIVITY
9-19-98	1800	TF7 Personnel depart Valdez enroute Seward. Mitchell, Knutsen, Keebler
9-20-98	0600-0700	Breakfast
9-20-98	0800	TF7 Personnel meet with BP/USCG/SUPSALV/OSRL personnel
9-20-98	0900	Morning Safety Meeting/Operations Meeting "All Hands"
9-20-98	0930-1200	Prepare OSRL/SUPSALV/USCG Equipment
9-20-98	1200-1300	Lunch
9-20-98	1300-1800	Familiarization with "Out of Region" Equipment
9-20-98	1800-1900	Evening meal
9-20-98	2000	Briefing with participants on weather forecast
9-21-98	0500-0600	Breakfast
9-21-98	0630	Morning Safety Meeting/Operations Meeting "All Hands"
9-21-98	0700	TF7/ST1 Begin deployment
9-21-98	0730	TF7/ST2 Begin deployment
9-21-98	0730	TF7/ST3 Begin deployment
9-21-98	0900	TF7/ST1 in "U" Module formation, hold for (2 hours)
9-21-98	0900	TF7/ST2 in VOSS formation, hold till observer aircraft arrives
9-21-98	0900	TF7/ST3 deployed with Lancer Barge, Marco V Skimmer
9-21-98	1100	TF7/ST1 divert (2) FV and "U" Boom to TF7/ST3 then hold Single "U" Module till observer aircraft arrives
9-21-98	1200	TF7/ST3 in full formation with "U" Boom, Marco and Lancer, hold till observer aircraft arrives
9-21-98	1200-1300	Lunch (Box lunches)
9-21-98	1330	Observer aircraft arrives onscene
9-21-98	1400	Observer aircraft departs exercise location
9-21-98	1500	Commence demobilization of TF7/ST1, 2, 3
9-21-98	1600	Demobilization complete
9-21-98	1700	Charter aircraft arrives to pick up Drill Participants enroute Chenega

Appendix F

NEARSHORE BRANCH
CHENEGA DIVISION
"MSRC" OUT OF REGION STRIKE TEAM #1

U-BOOM STRIKE TEAM COMPOSITION

Task Force #6	Strike Team #1	VHF Channel #74



VESSELS	PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT	CAPACITIES
Fishing Vessels: 10	**Vessel Crew:** 27	**Containment Boom:** 3 x 660 ft Ro-Boom	**Total N.P. Recovery BBLS/HR: TBD**
Skiff/Jitney: 6	**Response:** MSRC 6	**Skimmer:** (1) DESMI, Ocean (2) GT 185	**Total Storage:** 3000
Total: 10	**Total:** 33	**Storage Device:** (6) 500 bbl TSB	

NEARSHORE BRANCH
CHENEGA DIVISION
"MSRC" OUT OF REGION STRIKE TEAM #1

J-BOOM STRIKE TEAM COMPOSITION

Task Force #6	Strike Team #1	VHF Channel #74



VESSELS	PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT	CAPACITIES
Fishing Vessels: 10	**Vessel Crew:** 24	**Containment Boom:** 3 x 660 ft Ro-Boom	**Total N.P. Recovery BBLS/HR: TBD**
Skiff/Jitney: 6	**Response:** MSRC 6	**Skimmer:** (2) GT 185 (1) DESMI, ocean	**Total Storage:** 2500
Total: 10	**Total:** 28	**Storage Device:** 5 - 500 bbl TSB	

Appendix F

NEARSHORE BRANCH
CHENEGA DIVISION
"MSRC" OUT OF REGION STRIKE TEAM #1

CASCADE DIVERSION/CONCENTRATION ST COMPOSITION

Task Force #6	Strike Team #1	VHF Channel #74



VESSELS	PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT	CAPACITIES
Fishing Vessels: 10	**Vessel Crew: 20**	**Containment Boom: 4 x 660 ft Ro-Boom**	**Total N.P. Recovery BBLS/HR: 0**
Skiff/Jitney: 6	**Response: 1**	**Skimmer: 0**	**Total Storage: 0**
Total: 10	**Total: 21**	**Storage Device: 0**	

Appendix F

NEARSHORE BRANCH
CHENEGA DIVISION
"ACS" OUT OF REGION STRIKE TEAM #2

U-BOOM STRIKE TEAM COMPOSITION

Task Force #6	Strike Team #2	VHF Channel #72



VESSELS	PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT	CAPACITIES
Fishing Vessels: 10	**Vessel Crew: 27**	**Containment Boom: 3 x 660 ft Ro-Boom**	**Total N.P. Recovery BBLS/HR: TBD**
Skiff/Jitney: 6	**Response: SERVS (3)**	**Skimmer: (3) DESMI, Ocean**	**Total Storage: 2694 bbls**
Total:10	**Total: 30**	**Storage Device: (5) Mini Barges**	

NEARSHORE BRANCH
CHENEGA DIVISION
"USCG" OUT OF REGION STRIKE TEAM #3

SWEET BRIER/VOSS SYSTEM STRIKE TEAM COMPOSITION

Task Force #6	Strike Team #3	VHF Channel #TBD



VESSELS	PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT	CAPACITIES
Fishing Vessels: 1	**Vessel Crew:** 36	**Containment Boom:** VOSS	**Total N.P. Recovery BBLS/HR:**
Skiff/Jitney: 1	**Response:** 0	**Skimmer:** DESMI	**Total Storage:**
Total: 1	**Total:** 36	**Storage Device:** Mini Barge	

NEARSHORE BRANCH
SEWARD DIVISION
"USCG" OUT OF REGION STRIKE TEAM #2

IRONWOOD STRIKE TEAM COMPOSITION

Task Force #7	Strike Team #2	VHF Channel #69



VESSELS	PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT	CAPACITIES
Fishing Vessels: 0	**Vessel Crew: 36**	**Containment Boom: VOSS**	**Total N.P. Recovery BBLS/HR: TBD**
USCG Work Boat: 1	**Response: 0**	**Skimmer: VOSS**	**Total Storage: 500 bbls**
Total: 1	**Total: 36**	**Storage Device: (1) Lancer**	

Appendix F

NEARSHORE BRANCH
SEWARD DIVISION
"OSRL" OUT OF REGION STRIKE TEAM #1

U-BOOM STRIKE TEAM COMPOSITION

Task Force #7	Strike Team #1	VHF Channel #74

LOCATION: Seward
DATE: 9-21-98
TFL: Greg Knutsen/Jeff Keebler



Command Vessel: North Star

VESSELS	PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT	CAPACITIES
Fishing Vessels: 7	**Vessel Crew:** 18	**Containment Boom:** 4 x 400m Ro-Boom	**Total N.P. Recovery BBLS/HR: TBD**
Skiff/Jitney: 0	**Response:** (2) SERVS	**Skimmer:** (2) DESMI, Ocean	**Total Storage:** 1000 bbls
Total: 7	**Total:** 20	**Storage Device:** (2) Lancers	

NEARSHORE BRANCH
SEWARD DIVISION
"OSRL" OUT OF REGION STRIKE TEAM #1

J-BOOM STRIKE TEAM COMPOSITION

Task Force #7	Strike Team #1	VHF Channel #74



LOCATION: Seward
DATE: 9-21-98
TFL: Greg Knutsen/Jeff Keebler



Command Vessel: North Star

VESSELS	PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT	CAPACITIES
Fishing Vessels: 5	**Vessel Crew: 12**	**Containment Boom: 2 x 400m Ro-Boom**	**Total N.P. Recovery BBLS/HR: TBD**
Skiff/Jitney: 0	**Response: 2 SERVS**	**Skimmer: (2) DESMI Ocean**	**Total Storage: 1000 bbls**
Total: 5	**Total: 14**	**Storage Device: 2**	

NEARSHORE BRANCH
SEWARD DIVISION
"SUPSALV" OUT OF REGION STRIKE TEAM #3

MARCO V SKIMMER STRIKE TEAM COMPOSITION

Task Force #7	Strike Team #3	VHF Channel #72



VESSELS	PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT	CAPACITIES
Fishing Vessels: 3	**Vessel Crew:** 9	**Containment Boom:** 2 x 400m Ro-Boom	**Total N.P. Recovery BBLS/HR: TBD**
Skiff/Jitney: 0	**Response:** (3) SupSalv	**Skimmer:** MARCO V	**Total Storage:** 500 bbls
Total: 3	**Total:** 12	**Storage Device:** 1	

SONS DRILL
EVALUATION RATINGS
OVERALL

		1 – 5, 5 Best Average
1.	Day 4 IAP developed	
	A. Comprehensive	4.2
	B. Appropriate	4.1
	C. Logistics	3.9
2.	Adequate training	3.8
3.	UC effectively managed	3.8
4.	COPT coordination	3.5
5.	Information flow UC/NIC	3.0
6.	Integration	3.6
7.	General Plan	
	A. Comprehensive	3.8
	B. Long-term logistics	3.7
	C. Objectives, priorities, activities	3.8
8.	Logistics for sustained response	
	A. Long-term forecast	3.6
	B. Critical resources	3.5
	C. Integration	3.6
9.	Costs tracked/projected	3.6
10.	Claims strategy	3.8
11.	Response ™ effective	3.3
12.	Logistics Support Modules	3.5
13.	Training resources	3.2
14.	IT support	3.3
15.	CMT/NIC leadership	
	A. Integration	3.4
	B. Cooperation	3.8
	C. Conflict resolution	3.7
	D. Proactive issue management	3.8
	E. ARRT/NRT referrals	3.4
	F. Effective support of UC	3.8
	G. Information flow	3.0
	H. Community needs	3.6
16.	Effective ARRT/NRT support	3.3
17.	Public issues addressed	
	A. JIC established	4.2
	B. Timely responses	3.8
	C. Accurate information	3.8
18.	Effective community briefing	4.2
	A. Concerns expressed	4.2

19.	Realistic Exercise	3.9
	TOTAL SCORE / AVERAGE	**3.7**

SONS DRILL
EVALUATION RATINGS
BY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS

		ADEC	**BP**	**USCG**
		1 – 5, 5 Best	1 – 5, 5 Best	1 – 5, 5 Best
		Average	Average	Average
1.	Day 4 IAP developed			
	A. Comprehensive	3.9	4.2	4.0
	B. Appropriate	4.0	4.2	4.0
	C. Logistics	4.0	4.0	3.8
2.	Adequate training	3.6	3.9	3.7
3.	UC effectively managed	4.0	3.8	3.8
4.	COPT coordination	3.7	3.5	3.6
5.	Information flow UC/NIC	3.0	3.0	3.2
6.	Integration	3.6	3.8	3.0
7.	General Plan			
	A. Comprehensive	3.9	4.0	3.6
	B. Long-term logistics	3.9	3.9	3.4
	C. Objectives, priorities, activities	4.2	3.9	3.4
8.	Logistics for sustained response			
	A. Long-term forecast	3.8	3.6	3.3
	B. Critical resources	3.5	3.6	3.4
	C. Integration	3.6	3.6	3.4
9.	Costs tracked/projected	3.7	3.3	4.0
10.	Claims strategy	4.1	3.8	4.0
11.	Response ™ effective	3.8	3.5	3.2
12.	Logistics Support Modules	3.8	3.7	3.2
13.	Training resources	3.4	3.3	3.1
14.	IT support	3.6	3.3	3.1
15.	CMT/NIC leadership			
	A. Integration	3.9	3.6	3.0
	B. Cooperation	4.2	3.9	3.7
	C. Conflict resolution	3.8	3.8	3.7
	D. Proactive issue management	4.0	3.8	3.8
	E. ARRT/NRT referrals	3.6	3.4	3.3
	F. Effective support of UC	4.3	3.7	3.6
	G. Information flow	3.1	3.1	2.9
	H. Community needs	3.9	3.6	3.5
16.	Effective ARRT/NRT support	3.2	3.5	3.2
17.	Public issues addressed			
	A. JIC established	4.1	4.2	4.3
	B. Timely responses	4.0	3.8	3.9
	C. Accurate information	3.8	3.8	3.8
18.	Effective community briefing	4.1	4.2	4.3
	A. Concerns expressed	4.2	4.2	4.4

19.	Realistic Exercise	3.9	4.1	3.8
	TOTAL SCORE / AVERAGE	**3.8**	**3.8**	**3.6**

SONS DRILL
EVALUATION RATINGS
BY MAJOR LOCATIONS

		ANCHORAGE	**VALDEZ**
		1 – 5, 5 Best	1 – 5, 5 Best
		Average	Average
1.	Day 4 IAP developed		
	A. Comprehensive	4.0	4.3
	B. Appropriate	4.0	4.2
	C. Logistics	3.8	4.0
2.	Adequate training	3.9	3.7
3.	UC effectively managed	3.7	3.9
4.	COPT coordination	3.3	3.7
5.	Information flow UC/NIC	3.0	3.0
6.	Integration	2.9	4.0
7.	General Plan		
	A. Comprehensive	3.3	4.1
	B. Long-term logistics	3.3	3.9
	C. Objectives, priorities, activities	3.2	4.1
8.	Logistics for sustained response		
	A. Long-term forecast	3.2	3.8
	B. Critical resources	3.3	3.6
	C. Integration	3.3	3.7
9.	Costs tracked/projected	3.6	3.5
10.	Claims strategy	3.8	3.9
11.	Response ™ effective	3.4	3.3
12.	Logistics Support Modules	3.4	3.6
13.	Training resources	3.1	3.4
14.	IT support	3.1	3.4
15.	CMT/NIC leadership		
	A. Integration	3.1	3.6
	B. Cooperation	3.7	3.9
	C. Conflict resolution	3.8	3.6
	D. Proactive issue management	3.8	3.8
	E. ARRT/NRT referrals	3.4	3.4
	F. Effective support of UC	3.8	3.7
	G. Information flow	2.9	3.2
	H. Community needs	3.6	3.6
16.	Effective ARRT/NRT support	3.4	3.3
17.	Public issues addressed		
	A. JIC established	4.1	4.3
	B. Timely responses	3.7	3.9
	C. Accurate information	3.7	3.8
18.	Effective community briefing	4.3	4.2
	A. Concerns expressed	4.3	4.2

19.	Realistic Exercise	3.9	4.0
	TOTAL SCORE / AVERAGE	**3.6**	**3.8**

SONS POST-EXERCISE INTERVIEWS

NAME	ORGANIZATION	EXERCISE POSITION
Robert Baldwin	BP Oil Shipping Co., USA	Deputy IC
Pete Bontadelli	California OSPR	Evaluator
Michele Brown	ADEC	Crisis Manager
Richard Campbell	BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc.	Crisis Manager
Admiral Collins	USCG, Pacific Area	National IC
Admiral Cross	USCG, D-17	Deputy NIC
John Devens	RCAC – PWS	Observer
Larry Dietrick	ADEC	Evaluator/Tech. Advisor
Kurt Fredriksson	ADEC	Deputy Crisis Manager
Brad Hahn	ADEC	State On-Scene Coordinator, Central Alaska
Captain Hereth	USCG, HQ	Evaluator
Captain Hutmacher	USCG, MSO Anchorage	FOSC – Western Alaska
Captain Kuchin	USCG, NSFCC (past)	Evaluator
Steve Marshall	BP Oil Shipping Co., USA	RP – Incident Commander
Cmdr. Massey	USCG, D-17	PIO
LCDR Meza	USCG, HQ	Acting NRT Co-chair
Captain Morris	USCG, MSO Valdez	FOSC
Captain Page	USCG, Pacific Area	Chief of Staff
Captain Wilshire	USCG, NSFCC (present)	NIC Chief of Planning

ACRONYMS

A	
ABS	American Bureau of Shipping
ACCC	Anchorage Crisis Coordination Center
ACMP	Alaska Coastal Management Plan
ACS	Alaska Clean Seas
ADDS PAC	Aerial Dispersant Delivery System Package
ADEC	Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
ADF&G	Alaska Department of Fish & Game
ADNR	Alaska Department of Natural Resources
ADS	Aerial Dispersant Spray
ADSS	Automated Dependent Surveillance System
AEC	Anchorage Emergency Center
AEIDC	Arctic Environmental Information Data Center
AG	Attorney General
AIMS	Alyeska Integrity Management System
AKOSH	Alaska State Occupational Safety Health Standards
AMRC	Arctic Marine Response Corporation
ANPRM	Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making
ANS	Alaska North Slope
AOGA	Alaska Oil and Gas Association
AOGCC	Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
AP	Action Plan
API	American Petroleum Institute
APICOM	Alaska Pacific Cooperative Managers
APSC	Alyeska Pipeline Service Company
APUC	Alaska Public Utilities Company
AQR	Air Quality Regulations
ARC	Area Response Center
ARCS	Alaska Rural Communications System
ARLIS	Alaska Resources Library and Information System
ARRT	Alaska Regional Response Team
ARTS	Alyeska Radio Telephone System
AS	Alaska Statute
ASA	Applied Science Associates, Inc.
ASTM	American Society Testing & Materials
ATOM	Alyeska Tactical Oil Spill Model
B	
BETX	Benzene/Ethylbenzene/Toluene/Xylenes
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
BMPP	Best Management Practices Plan
BOC	Berth Operations Center
BOM	Berth Operations Manual

ACRONYMS

BST	Business Support Team
BTT	Biotreatment Tank
BTV	Ballast Tank Vessel
BWT	Ballast Water Treatment
BWTF	Ballast Water Treatment Facility
BWTP	Ballast Water Treatment Plant
C	
C-PLAN	Contingency Plan
CAA	Clean Air Act
CAAA	Clean Air Act Amendments
CAMA	Cordova Aquaculture Marketing Association
CCA	Cause Consequence Analysis/Communication Counsel of America
CDFU	Cordova District Fishermen United
CEB	Central Electronics Bank
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CG	Coast Guard
CIC	Combat Information Center
CID	Chief Inspections Department
CIRCAC	Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council
CIS	Communications/Information Specialist
CISPRI	Cook Inlet Spill Prevention and Response, Inc.
CMT	Crisis Management Team
COC	Citizens Oversight Council (on Oil & Hazardous Substances)
COFR	Certificate of Financial Responsibility
COTP	Captain of the Port
COW	Crude Oil Wash
CRC	Community Response Center
CRWG	Coastal Resources Work Group
CSRP	Contaminated Site Remediation Program
CV	Check Valve
CVTA	Copper Valley Telephone Association
CWA	Clean Water Act
CZM	Coastal Zone Management
D	
DAF	Dissolved Air Filtration
DBBWG	Dispersant Burning and Bioremediation Working Group
DEC	Department of Environmental Conservation
DES	Department of Emergency Services
DGC	Department of Governmental Coordination
DGPS	Differential Global Positioning System
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services

ACRONYMS

DIC	Deputy Incident Commander
DID	Direct Inward Dialing
DNR	Department of Natural Resources
DO	Dissolved Oxygen
DOA	Department of Agriculture
DOC	Department of Commerce
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOL	Department of Labor
DOP	Department of Operating Procedure
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DRP	Data Recording & Playback
DSS	Dynamic Skimming System
DSV	Dynamic Skimming Vessel
DTTS	Disabled Tanker Towing Study
DWT	Deadweight Tonnage
E	
ECDIS	Electronic Chart & Display Information System
EIC	Emergency Information Center
EMC	Environmental Monitoring Committee (CIRCAC)
EMT	Emergency Medic Technician
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOV	Effectively Owned Vessel
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPU	Emergency Preparedness Unit
ERB	Emergency Response Building
ERV	Escort Response Vessel
ESI	Environmental Sensitivity Index
EVOS	Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
F	
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FCCM	Flexible Channel Control Modules
FD	Fluor Daniel
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FERC	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FOG	Field Operations Guide
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FONSI	Findings of No Significant Impact
FOSC	Federal On-Scene Coordinator
FPTF	Fire Prevention Task Force

ACRONYMS

FR	Federal Regulations
FRC	Fast Recovery Craft
FV	Fishing Vessel
FVA	Fishing Vessel Administrator
FWPCA	Federal Water Pollution Control Act
FWS	Fish and Wildlife Service
G	
G/MEP	USCG Marine Environmental Protection Division
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GMDSS	Global Marine Distress and Safety Systems
GOA	Gulf of Alaska
GRD	Geographic Resource Database
H	
HAP's	Hazardous Air Pollutants
HAZOP	Hazardous Operability
HAZWOPER	Hazardous Waste Operations & Emergency Response Program
HE	Hazardous Emissions
HFSSB	High Frequency Single-Sideband
HVAC	High Velocity Air Conditioning
HW	Hazardous Waste
I	
IALA	International Association Lighthouse Authority
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IBRRC	International Bird Rescue & Research Center
IBU	Inland Boatman's Union
IC	Incident Commander
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
IFR	Instrument Flight Rules / Interim Final Rule
IG	Inert Gas
IGS	Inert Gas System
IH	Industrial Hygiene
IHV	Fish Virus
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IMS	Institute of Marine Science (Seward)
IMT	Incident Management Team
INMARSAT	International Maritime Satellite Communication Terminal
IOPP	International Oil Pollution Prevention
IRIC	Initial Response Incident Commander
ISCC	Interagency Spill Clean-Up Committee
ISV	Ice Scout Vessel
IT	Information Technology

ACRONYMS

ITOPF	Independent Tanker Owners Pollution Federation
IWR	International Wildlife Response (Otter Rehabilitation)
IWRC	Individual Wire Rope Core
J	
JIC	Joint Information Center
L	
LCV	Landing Craft Vessel
LEFM	Leading Edge Flow Model
LEPCs	Local Emergency Planning Committees
LERTs	Local Emergency Response Teams
LIO	Legislative Information Office
LRP	Long Range Plan
LTV	Loaded Tank Vessel
LVB	Line Volume Balance
M	
MAC	Multi-Agency Coordinating Group
MCM	Mobile Communications Modules
MCTWG	Mechanical Containment Training Work Group
MGO	Marine Gas Oil
MMS	Minerals Management Service
MOA	Memo of Agreement
MOU	Memo of Understanding
MOV	Mechanically Operated Valve
MPA	Marine Preservation Alliance
MSO	Marine Safety Office
MSRC	Marine Spill Response Corporation
N	
NCBC	National Climate Buoy Center
NCDC	National Climate Data Center
NCP	National Contingency Plan
NEC	National Electric Code
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NIC	National Incident Command
NIIMS	National Interagency Incident Management System
NIOSH	National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Testing
NMFS	National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA	National Oceanographic Atmospheric Administration
NOV	Notice of Violation
NPDES	National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
NPRM	Notice of Proposed Rule Making
NPS	National Park Service

ACRONYMS

NRC	National Response Center / National Research Council
NRDA	Natural Resource Damage Assessment
NRP	Nearshore Response Plan
NRT	National Response Team
NS	North Slope
NSB	North Slope Borough
NSWG	Nearshore Work Group
NTIS	National Technical Information Service
NTP	Notice to Proceed
NTSB	National Transportation Safety Board
NVIC	Navigation Vessel Inspection Circular
NWF	National Wildlife Federation
NWS	National Weather Service
O	
OBQ	On Board Quality
OCC	Operations Control Center
OCIMF	Oil Company International Marine Forum
OCMI	Office in Charge of Marine Inspection
OHMSETT	Oil & Hazardous Materials Environmental Testing Tank
OPA 90	Oil Pollution Act of 1990
ORA	Oil Reform Alliance
ORB	Oil Record Book
ORB	Oil Response Vessel
OSC	On-Scene Coordinator
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSPIC	Oil Spill Public Information Center
OSPR	Oil Spill Prevention Response Committee (RCAC)
OSRL	Oil Spill Response Limited
OSRO	Oil Spill Removal Organization
OSRV	Oil Spill Response Vessel
P	
PAH	Polyaromatic Hydrocarbons, Aromatic Hydrocarbons, Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbons
PC	Politically Correct
PCWA	Projects Contractors Waste Area
PCWG	Pollution Control Work Group
PDB	Pre-Deballast Survey
PDC	Power Distribution Center
PEL	Permissible Exposure Levels
PFD	Personal Flotation Device
PHA	Process Hazard Analysis
PIRO	Petroleum Industry Response Organization

ACRONYMS

PM	Personal Monitoring
POVTS	Port Operations Vessel Traffic Systems (RCAC)
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PREP	National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program
PROPS	Prevention, Response, Operations and Safety (CIRCAC)
PRP	Primary Responsible Party
PSTN	Public Service Telephone Network
PWS	Prince William Sound
PWSAC	Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation
PWSCA	Prince William Sound Conservation Alliance
PWSCC	Prince William Sound Community College
PWS RCAC	Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council
PWSSSA	Prince William Sound Seiners Association
PWSSSC	Prince William Sound Science Center (Cordova)
PWSTA	Prince William Sound Tanker Association
PWSSTP	Prince William Sound Towing Package
PWSTSPRP	Prince William Sound Tanker Spill Prevention Response Plan
Q	
QA/QC	Quality Assurance / Quality Control
QDC	Quick Disconnect Coupling
QRA	Quantitative Risk Analysis
R	
RAC	Response Action Contractor
RCAC	Regional Citizens Advisory Council
RCCC	Regional Control Communication Center
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RFP	Request for Proposal
RFQ	Request for Qualification
RGV	Remote Gate Valve
RMOL	Realistic Maximum Operating Limit
ROB	Remaining (Residual) On Board
RPG	Response Planning Group
RPS	Response Planning Standard
RPT	Regional Planning Team
RPWG	Oil Spill Restoration and Planning Work Group
RRT	Regional Response Team
RSA	Reimbursable Service Agreement
RTWG	Response Team Working Group
RVGO	Raw Vacuum Gas Oil
S	
SAA	Satellite Accumulation Area
SAC	Scientific Advisory Committee (RCAC)

ACRONYMS

SARA Title III	Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
SBT	Segregated Ballast Tank
SC	Steering Committee
SCADA	Supervisory Control & Data Acquisition
SCAT	Shoreline Clean-Up Assessment Team
SEALS	Skill Enhancement & Leadership Seminars
SEAPRO	Southeast AK Petroleum Resource Organization, Inc.
SERC	State Emergency Response Commission
SERVS	Ship Escort and Response Vessel System
SI	Surface Impoundment
SID	Supplemental Information Document
SLAR	Side Looking Airborne Radar
SMP	Ship Motion Program
SNPR	Special Notice Proposed Rule Making
SONS	Spill of National Significance
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOQ	Statement of Qualifications
SOS	Seldovia Oil Spill Response
SOSC	State On-Scene Coordinator
SPAR	Spill Prevention and Response
SPCC	Spill Prevention Control & Contingency
SWAPA	South West Alaska Pilots Association
SWI	Solid Waste Incinerator (Terminal)
T	
TAG	Technical Advisory Group
TAPAA	Trans Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
TAPS	Trans-Alaska Pipeline System
TBT	Tributyltin
TOEM	Terminal Operations & Environmental Monitoring (RCAC)
TWA	Time Weighted Average
TSCA	Toxic Substances Control Act
TES	Terminal Environmental Specialists
TSS	Traffic Separation System
U	
UAA	University of Alaska, Anchorage
UAF	University of Alaska, Fairbanks
UC	Unified Command
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USFWS	United States Fish and Wildlife Service
V	
VAHS	Valdez Air Health Study

ACRONYMS

VAREC	Trade name for shore tank gauging equipment
VCCC	Valdez Crisis Coordination Center
VEOC	Valdez Emergency Operations Center
VERB	Valdez Escort Response Base
VGO	Vacuum Gas Oil
VMOC	Valdez Marine Operations Committee
VMT	Valdez Marine Terminal
VOC	Valdez Operations Center / Volatile Organic Compounds
VOO	Vessel of Opportunity
VOSS	Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System
VRCA	Versatile Response Co. of Alaska Environmental Services
VRP	Vessel Response Plan
VTC	Vessel Tracking Center
VTEC	Valdez Terminal Emergency Center
VTS	Vessel Traffic Service
W	
WAPA	Western Alaska Pilots Association
WG	Working Group
WMEB	Wastewater Management & Enforcement Branch
WRV	Weir Boom Response Vessel